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ABSTRACT 
Contracting with service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses (SDVOSBs) is 
widely promoted as an important benefit for veterans, particularly at the Department of 
Defense (DOD) and its component the Department of the Navy (DOD).  In FY2014, 
DOD finally met its three (3) percent SDVOSB statutory contact spending goal, while 
DON made significant strides towards meeting it. This real progress came despite five (5) 
academic assessments which persistently suggested that the SDVOSB Procurement 
Program’s design contain inherent conceptual flaws that sow confusion among disabled 
veterans and Contracting Officers about scope of discretion to assist SDVOSBs, generate 
widespread disillusionment among veterans, promote entrenchment by a few already 
successful firms instead of helping veterans at large to obtain self-employment, and 
thereby impede goal achievement. This study tests the academic criticisms by examining 
the SDVOSB Program design and operation trends through the prism of the generally 
accepted Cohen-Eimicke Contract Management Performance Model.  Finally, this study 
proposes veteran-centric performance management realignments of the SDVOSB 
Program at DOD and DON through the use of targeted set-asides and Simplified 
Acquisition Procedures (SAP) in order to match the Program with its original intent of 
broad-based SDVOSB business development.   
            
DISCLAIMER: Nothing in this study shall be construed as an expression of official 
views of the Department of Defense or the Department of the Navy, or as comments on 
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I. INTRODUCTION: THE SIGNIFICANCE OF SERVICE-
DISABLED VETERAN-OWNED SMALL BUSINESS (SDVOSB) 
CONTRACTING FOR THE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE AND 
THE NAVY. 
“We need to look at this from the perspective of the soldier, not the perspective of the 
government.” – Former Secretary of Defense Robert M. Gates on the wounded 
warrior transition system in Duty: Memoirs of a Secretary at War.
1
     
 
Successful self-employment of service-disabled veterans (SDVs) through 
entrepreneurship, including veterans going into business with Federal civilian and 
military agencies, has become our avowed national policy priority
2
 and a frequent topic 
of academic research.
3
  Since the mid-1970s, various Federal commissions and legislative 
policymakers of both parties have authorized and promoted procurement assistance for 
veterans and, especially, SDVs seeking self-employment.  The current Service-Disabled 
Veteran-Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) Procurement Program consists of two set-
aside tools, namely, a discretionary authority to set aside contracting opportunities for 
competition among SDVOSBs (competitive set-aside) and a discretionary authority to set 
aside contracting opportunities for sole source awards to a SDVOSBs without 
competition (sole source set-aside); the Federal Program is government-wide but each 
agency has its own replica of the government-wide Program (except for the Department 
of Veterans Affairs).
4
  Such replicas exist in the Department of Defense (DOD) and its 
                                                 
1 ROBERT M. GATES, DUTY: MEMOIRS OF A SECRETARY AT WAR 138 (Knopf ed., 2014). 
2 Dina El-Boghdady, Set-Aside Programs Fall Short of Goals, The Washington Post (Feb. 28, 2005), 
available at: http://www.lmt-
inc.com/pdf/news_and_press/2005_02_setaside_programs_fall_short_of_goals.pdf.  
3 See, e.g., Jennifer L. Humensky, Neil Jordan, Kevin T. Stroupe, and Denise M. Hynes, How Are 
Iraq/Afghanistan-Era Veterans Fairning in the Labor Market, 39 ARMED FORCES & SOCIETY, issue I, 158-
183 (2013); Jared Hoppenfeld, Trip Wyckoff, Jo Ann J. Henson, Jenna N. Mayotte, and Hal. P. Kirkwood, 
Jr., Librarians and the Entrepreneurship Bootcamp for Veterans: Helping Veterans with Business 
Research, 18 JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & FINANCE LIBRARIANSHIP, issue 4, 293-308 (2013); U.S. SMALL 
BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION OFFICE OF ADVOCACY (SBA ADVOCACY), Veteran-Owned Business and Their 
Owners: Data from the Census Bureau’s Survey of Business Owners (2012). 
4 FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION (FAR) COUNCIL, Procurement Program for Service-Disabled 
Veteran-Owned Small Businesses, Interim Rule with Request for Comments, 69 Fed. Reg. 25,274 (May 5, 
 2 
component Department of the Navy (DON) that is responsible for the U.S. Navy and the 
U.S. Marine Corps contracting.  These set-aside tools were enacted in 2003 in light of the 
government’s failure to attain the prime contracting goal to spend at least 3 percent of 
total Federal purchases with SDVOSBs; along with the 3 percent subcontracting goal, the 
prime contracting minimum goal was enacted four years earlier in 1999.   
 
Since inception, the Federal and DOD Programs have experienced continued turbulence 
because of design and re-design attempts by not only the DOD but also by the Congress, 
the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) Council (representing the White House Office 
of Federal Procurement Policy (OFPP), the DOD, the General Services Administration 
(GSA), and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration (NASA)), the Small 
Business Administration (SBA), Presidential Administrations, and even judicial and 
administrative tribunals such as the Government Accountability Office (GAO), the Court 
of Federal Claims (COFC), and the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC).  
One of the most far-reaching SDVOSB Program design attempts by the Executive 
Branch occurred on March 23, 2005, when the FAR Council made it one of the stated 
purposes of the entire FAR Part 13, Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP), “to 
improve opportunities for . . . service-disabled veteran-owned small business concerns to 
obtain a fair proportion of Government contracts.”5 The effects of SDVOSB Program 
design and re-design efforts are considered in this study.    
 
Historically, most SDVOSB contracting advocates as well as the DOD and DON 
themselves have recognized the moral, rehabilitative, and economic significance of its 
SDVOSB Procurement Program due to DOD’s special nexus to its former military 
members who incurred or aggravated service-connected disabilities.  Perhaps the most 
                                                                                                                                                 
2004), available at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2004-05-05/pdf/04-9752.pdf; Final Rule, 70 Fed. 
Reg. 14,950 (March 23, 2005), available at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2005-03-23/pdf/05-
5656.pdf.  
5 FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION (FAR) COUNCIL, Procurement Program for Service-Disabled 
Veteran-Owned Small Businesses, Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 14,950 (March 23, 2005), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2005-03-23/pdf/05-5656.pdf, amending FAR §13.002(b), Purpose 
(2005).  The May 5, 2004 Interim Rule contained no such change.   
 3 
comprehensive recognition is found in a 2007 policy memorandum by Under Secretary of 
Defense for Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics (USD AT&L) Kenneth Krieg:  
I urge the acquisition community and major commands  . . . to meet the 3 percent 
procurement goal established by Congress and incorporated into the DOD 
Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Strategic Plan. . . . The 
Department has made contract awards to firms owned by service-disabled 
veterans who have served in World War II, the Korean War, the Vietnam War, the 
Gulf Wars, Operation ENDURING FREEDOM and IRAQI FEREEDOM. While 
we have made progress towards meeting the goal, we still have a long way to go. 
We must pursue this goal with vigor.  Many more disabled veterans will return 
from the campaigns in Iraq and Afghanistan and will seek to participate in DOD 
procurements. . . . By contracting with these teams of businesses owned by 
service-disabled veterans, we acknowledge their service as Warfighters and 




In the follow-up memorandum, the USD AT&L Office of Defense Procurement and 
Acquisition Policy (DPAP) stated: 
We need to dedicate efforts toward promoting increased business opportunities 
for those warfighters who have sacrificed in service to our Nation.  By increasing 
business opportunities for SDVOSB concerns, not only will we demonstrate 
improvement towards meeting our goals, we will also be giving something back to 
the service-disabled veterans by creating opportunities for them to provide goods 
and services in support of the DOD mission.”7   
 
                                                 
6 OFFICE OF THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS (USD 
AT&L), Memoranda, Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Procurement Program (April 12, 
2007), and GSA GWAC for SDVOSBs in Information Technology (May 18, 2007), available at: 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/2007-0828-DPAP.pdf.   
7 USD ATL&L, Memoranda, Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Procurement Program 
(April 12, 2007), and GSA GWAC for SDVOSBs in Information Technology (May 18, 2007), available at: 
http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/2007-0828-DPAP.pdf.     
 4 
The DON leadership announced similar policies.  The August 24, 2006 memorandum by 
the Under Secretary of the Navy (UNSECNAV) Dionel Aviles stated:  
Despite the Department’s success in increasing the total dollars awarded 
SDVOSBs, DON failed to achieve the 3 percent goal. . . . To assist Federal 
agencies with achieving this goal for contracts awarded to SDVOSBs, Congress . 
. . created a procurement set-aside program for small businesses owned and 
controlled by service-disabled veterans. . . . Additionally, Executive Order 13360 
of October 20, 2004 emphasizes the importance of increasing Federal contracting 
and subcontracting opportunities with SDVOSBs. . . . Achieving the three percent 
SDVOSB goal is a major challenge.  To achieve success, the DON must improve 
its record of awarding contracts to America’s service-disabled veteran-owned 
small businesses. Please relay the message to your acquisition workforce that you 
expect their whole-hearted support in increasing SDVOSB firms’ participation in 
your acquisition programs.
8
   
 
The December 4, 2007 memorandum by the Director, Secretary of the Navy Office of 
Small Business Programs (SECNAV OSBP) and the Acting Assistant Secretary of the 
Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN RD&A), endorsed the above-
referenced DOD and DON memoranda, and further stated: 
It is the policy of the Department of the Navy (DON) to provide maximum 
practicable opportunities in its acquisitions to service-disabled veteran-owned 
small businesses. In recognition of the debt owed to our service-disabled 
veterans, please ask each member of your Navy/Marine Corps Team to review all 
current and future requirements with a view to increasing awards of prime 
contracts and subcontracts to SDVOSB concerns.
9
    
                                                 
8 Dionel Aviles, Under Secretary of the Navy (UNSECNAV), Memorandum, Contracting with Service-
Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Businesses (Aug. 24, 2006), 
http://www.secnav.navy.mil/rda/Policy/2006%20Policy%20Memoranda/sericedisabled24aug2006aviles.pd
f. 
9 Tim Foreman, Director, Secretary of the Navy Office of Small Business Programs (SECNAV OSBP) and 
John Thackrah, Acting Assistant Secretary of the Navy for Research, Development, and Acquisition (ASN 
RD&A), Memorandum, Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program Performance (Dec. 4, 
2007), available at: 
http://www.secnav.navy.mil/rda/Policy/2007%20Policy%20Memoranda/sericedisabled00604dec071.pdf.  
 5 
The economic size of DOD’s SDVOSB contracting reinforces its moral and rehabilitative 
significance. Over the last decade, since Executive Order 13360, Providing Opportunities 
for Service-Disabled Veteran Businesses to Increase Their Federal Contracting and 
Subcontracting,
10
 made 3 percent the mandatory goal floor for its procurement spending, 
the Federal Procurement Data System (FPDS)
11
 reported a total of $42,611,209,441.34 in 
taxpayer dollars spent by DOD towards SDVOSB goals, with annual goal-report 
spending rising from $1,106,784,586.32 in Fiscal Year (FY) 2005 to $7,015,585,365.61 
in FY2014.  The FPDS likewise reported a total of $ $9,447,283,494.56 spent by DON, 
with annual goal-report spending rising from $170,906,769.61 in FY2005 to 
$1,768,749,049.22 in FY2014.  On October 14, 2014, the Director, DOD Office of Small 
Business Program (OSBP), announced that DOD met and exceeded the 3 percent 
SDVOSB contracting goal for the first time ever during FY2014.
12
  According to FPDS, 
the FY2014 DON SDVOSB goal achievement result was at 2.3309 percent, up from 
1.7419 percent in FY2013. Continued growth of SDVOSB contracting, as well as 
continued success of the SDVOSB Program and the achievement of the SDVOSB goal, 
are thus major imperatives for DOD and DON.    
 
                                                                                                                                                 
The maximum practicable opportunity policy for SDVOSBs is confirmed in the Navy-Marine Corps 
Acquisition Regulation Supplement (NMCARS) § 5219.201, General Policy (2013).  
10 President George W. Bush, Exec. Order 13360, Providing Opportunities for Service-Disabled Veteran 
Businesses to Increase Their Federal Contracting and Subcontracting (Oct. 20, 2004), available at: 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2004-10-26/pdf/04-24098.pdf. 
11 See U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (GSA), Federal Procurement Data System-Next 
Generation (FPDS-NG) (2015), available at: https://www.fpds.gov.   
12 Claudette Roulo, DOD NEWS, DEFENSE MEDIA ACTIVITY, Small Business Contracting on the Rise, 
Official Says (Oct. 14, 2014), http://www.defense.gov/News-Article-View/Article/603453. 
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II. THE PARADOX OF DOD SPENDING GOAL ACHIEVEMENT 
DESPITE ACADEMIC PREDICTIONS OF PROGRAM 
MALFUNCTION: RESEARCH PROBLEM, QUESTIONS, AND 
HYPOTHESIS. 
The very real FY2014 DOD goaling achievement created a paradox that is this study’s 
research problem: the success came notwithstanding predictions of SDVOSB Program 
malfunctions in at least five (5) academic assessments of the Program to date as well as 
the DON’s continued lag in meeting the 3 percent goal.  What, then, are the significance 
and the sustainability prospects of DOD’s goal achievement?  What of the contrast 
between DOD and DON goaling performance results? Does DOD’s achievement 
disprove the criticism about the SDVOSB Program’s design and effectiveness?   
 
The most significant, and direst, warnings about the SDVOSB Program came in the 2013 
Rand Corporation study by Cox and Moore, Improving Federal and Department of 
Defense Use of Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Businesses,
13
 commissioned by DOD 
OSBP itself. That study questioned that the 3 percent goal could ever be achieved, 
highlighted persistent veteran disillusionment with the SDVOSB Program, and criticized 
the Program’s discretionary design as not conducive to veterans’ business development. 
Those findings by Cox and Moore findings echoed prior criticism from academia, 
veterans groups, and some in Congress.
14
  With its significant spending volume and high 
public profile, the Federal and DOD SDVOSB Procurement Programs have been subject 
to research studies by multiple government agencies and academic researchers.  Much of 
that research concentrates on the problems of fraud, manipulation, and misrepresentation 
surrounding qualifications for SDVOSB status or for reporting of SDVOSB 
                                                 
13 See Amy G. Cox and Nancy Y. Moore, Improving Federal and Department of Defense Use of Service-
Disabled Veteran-Owned Businesses, RAND RESEARCH REPORT 322 (2013), available at: 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR322/RAND_RR322.pdf. 
14 Accord U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS (HSBC), SUBCOMMITTEE 
ON WORKFORCE, EMPOWERMENT, AND GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, and COMMITTEE ON VETERANS AFFAIRS 
(HVAC), SUBCOMMITTEE ON BENEFITS, Hearing on Excellence in Action: Government Support of Disabled 




  There is also some research literature which simply lumps SDVOSBs 
together with other socioeconomic programs as one of the heterogeneous many.
16
  
However, there have been 5 SDVOSB Program assessments in the legal and policy 
academia, which studied the issues of effectiveness of the SDVOSB Procurement 
Program and barriers to its success.  Those assessments include the 2004 Congressional 
testimony of Professor Schooner
17







 all analyzing the Program’s original design, as well as the above-
mentioned policy research study by Cox and Moore,
21
 surveying its beneficiaries for 
barriers to success.    
 
The first assessment came on July 15, 2004, when the House Small Business and 
Veterans Affairs Committees held the Hearing on Excellence in Action: Government 
Support of Disabled Veteran-Owned Businesses.
22
  Professor Steven Schooner strongly 
                                                 
15 See, e.g., U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small 
Business Program: Vulnerability to Fraud and Abuse Remains, GAO-12-967 (August 2012), and Service-
Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Program: Case Studies Show Fraud and Abuse Allowed 
Ineligible Firms to Obtain Millions of Dollars in Contracts, GAO-10-108 (October 2009).  
16 See, e.g., Nancy Y. Moore, Clifford A. Grammich, Julie DaVanzo, Bruce Held, John Coombs, Judith D. 
Mele, Enhancing Small Business Opportunities in the DOD, RAND TECHNICAL REPORT 601-1 (2009), 
available at: http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/technical_reports/2008/RAND_TR601-1.pdf.   
17 See HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS (HSBC), SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
WORKFORCE, EMPOWERMENT, AND GOVERNMENT PROGRAMS, and COMMITTEE ON VETERANS AFFAIRS 
(HVAC), SUBCOMMITTEE ON BENEFITS, Hearing on Excellence in Action: Government Support of Disabled 
Veteran-Owned Businesses, HSBC No. 108-73, HVAC No. 108-48 (July 15, 2004) (Statement of Professor 
Schooner).   
18 Paul Sherman, Paved with Good Intentions: Obstacles to Meeting Federal Contracting Goals for 
Service-Disabled Veterans-Owns Small Business, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 125 (2006). 
19 Theron Korsak, The Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business in the Federal Marketplace, THE 
ARMY LAWYER, DEPT. OF THE ARMY PAM 27-50-422, 47-48 (2008). 
20 Kelly McGann, Benign Neglect: Veteran-Owned Small Business in Federal Procurement Today, 6 
VETERANS L. REV. 187 (2014). 
21 Amy G. Cox and Nancy Y. Moore, Improving Federal and Department of Defense Use of Service-
Disabled Veteran-Owned Businesses, RAND RESEARCH REPORT 322 (2013), available at: 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR322/RAND_RR322.pdf.  
22 See U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS (HSBC), SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
WORKFORCE, EMPOWERMENT, and Government Programs, and COMMITTEE ON VETERANS AFFAIRS 
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criticized the SDVOSB Program’s design.  Some of Schooner’s arguments appeared to 
be largely philosophical in nature and derived from his 2002 paper Desiderata: 
Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law:
23
 that set-asides and sole source 
contracts are inconsistent with systemic principles of efficiency and competition; that the 
program “merely redistributes opportunities” and “further subdivides the existing small 
business pie by pitting small businesses against each other”; and that asking the 
acquisition workforce “without additional resources, to cater to special interest groups, is 
unrealistic and arguably fiscally irresponsible.”24  His other arguments were pragmatic: 
that the goal feature of the Program “may not be the most efficient tools if your purpose 
is to broadly distribute contract opportunities to emerging firms” because “Contracting 
Officers have an incentive to award the largest possible contract to the smallest number 
of eligible firms” and thereby favor “the most successful or strongest existing firms . . . 
many of which strategically avoid formal growth.”25  
 
Two years later, in the fall 2006 Public Contract Law Journal note Paved with Good 
Intentions: Obstacles to Meeting Federal Contracting Goals for Service-Disabled 
Veteran-Owned Small Businesses,
26
 Sherman provided perhaps the most cogent critique 
of the Program’s entrenchment challenge. Echoing Schooner’s 2004 testimony, he 
observed: “[T]he program seems almost paradoxical. To the extent that the SDVOSB 
program assists service-disabled veterans who are already the owners of successful small 
businesses, it arguably provides assistance to the least-needy members of the service-
                                                                                                                                                 
(HVAC), SUBCOMMITTEE ON BENEFITS, Hearing on Excellence in Action: Government Support of Disabled 
Veteran-Owned Businesses, HSBC No. 108-73, HVAC No. 108-48 (July 15, 2004). 
23 See generally, Steven L. Schooner, Desiderata: Objectives for a System of Government Contract Law, 11 
PUB. PROC. L. REV. 103 (2002). 
24 U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, COMMITTEE ON SMALL BUSINESS (HSBC), SUBCOMMITTEE ON 
WORKFORCE, EMPOWERMENT, and Government Programs, and COMMITTEE ON VETERANS AFFAIRS 
(HVAC), SUBCOMMITTEE ON BENEFITS, Hearing on Excellence in Action: Government Support of Disabled 
Veteran-Owned Businesses, HSBC No. 108-73, HVAC No. 108-48 (July 15, 2004) (Statement of Professor 
Schooner). 
25 Id.   
26 Paul Sherman, Paved with Good Intentions: Obstacles to Meeting Federal Contracting Goals for 
Service-Disabled Veterans-Owns Small Business, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 125 (2006). 
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disabled veteran community. Indeed, the program appears considerably more likely to 
reward already successful SDVOSBs, further exacerbating entrenchment concerns, than 
to create significant opportunities for new SDVOSBs.”27  Sherman, however, made much 
of this challenge on philosophical objections to effectiveness of set-asides.  Not 
surprisingly, Sherman opposed making SDVOSB set-asides mandatory instead of 
discretionary; instead, Sherman called for increased information about SDVOSB 
capabilities.   
 
The third assessment came in July 2008, when Korsak’s Army Lawyer article The 
Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Businesses in the Federal Marketplace
28
 
addressed the Federal government’s progress in implementing the SDVOSB Procurement 
Program in the wake of EO 13360. His view of the Order was positive, but guarded: “The 
order provided much-needed direction and a clear mandate to the heads of federal 
agencies.  Agency officials no longer could ignore the legislative framework that 
Congress created to assist service-disabled veteran-owned businesses. In the order, the 
President outlined the respective roles for [agency heads and] . . . also directed all federal 
agency heads to develop a ‘strategic plan’ to implement the policies as prescribed by 
Congress. In the years immediately following the executive order the number of contracts 
awarded to service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses increased, but at a sluggish 
rate. The slow growth prompted further congressional direction.”29  Korsak noted that 
“Congress squarely placed the task of ensuring success of the service-disabled veteran-
owned small business program on the shoulders of Federal [buying] agencies.”30 He 
attributed implementation challenges to regulatory burdens on Contracting Officers’ 
discretion.  These included: conflicts with other socio-economic small business 
programs; conflicts with business or administrative pressures to bundle or consolidate 
                                                 
27 Paul Sherman, Paved with Good Intentions: Obstacles to Meeting Federal Contracting Goals for 
Service-Disabled Veterans-Owns Small Business, 36 PUB. CONT. L.J. 125 (2006). 
28 Theron Korsak, The Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business in the Federal Marketplace, THE 
ARMY LAWYER, DEPT. OF THE ARMY PAM 27-50-422, 47-48 (2008). 
29 Id. 
30 Id., at 56. 
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contracts; and, finally, the potential of size, status, and bid protests where agency 
identifications of SDVOSBs, responsibility determinations, and acquisition strategies 
may be challenged for arbitrariness, caprice, or abuse of discretion.
31
   
 
The 2013 Rand Corporation report by Cox and Moore
32
 was dedicated to both design and 
functioning of the Federal and DOD SDVOSB Programs.  It was commissioned by 
Director, DOD OSBP, “to investigate barriers to entry for Service Disabled Veteran 
Owned Small Businesses (SDVOSBs). This study [was to] outline progress towards 
meeting SDVOSB prime contracting goals for DOD, and incidentally for other federal 
agencies and the federal government as a whole. It [was intended to] also identify any 
barriers SDVOSBs face in forming small businesses and winning prime contract awards 
and recommend ways to reduce these barriers.”33  Relying on surveys and interviews of 
SDVOSBs and DOD officials, the 2013 Cox and Moore study
34
 identified three major 
categories of barriers to SDVOSB participation in DOD prime contracts and DOD’s 
SDVOSB goal attainment.   
 
The first barrier category concerned the understandings of DOD Contracting Officers of 
the discretionary nature of the SDVOSB Program authorities to conduct sole source and 
competitive SDVOSB set-asides.  Two barriers within this category included differences 
between SDVOSB and other small business contracting programs such as HUBZone or 
Section 8(a) SDB programs: (1) higher statutory or agency-negotiated goals for firms in 
                                                 
31 Theron Korsak, The Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business in the Federal Marketplace, THE 
ARMY LAWYER, DEPT. OF THE ARMY PAM 27-50-422, 47-48 (2008). 
32 Amy G. Cox and Nancy Y. Moore, Improving Federal and Department of Defense Use of Service-
Disabled Veteran-Owned Businesses, RAND RESEARCH REPORT 322 (2013), available at: 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR322/RAND_RR322.pdf. 
33 Andre Gudger, Director, Department of Defense Office of Small Business Programs (DOD OSBP), 
Testimony before the Subcommittee on Technology, Information Policy, Intergovernmental Relations and 
Procurement Reform, House Committee on Oversight and Government Reform (Feb. 7, 2012), available at: 
http://oversight.house.gov/wp-content/uploads/2012/02/2-7-2012_Tech_Gudger.pdf. 
34 See Amy G. Cox and Nancy Y. Moore, Improving Federal and Department of Defense Use of Service-
Disabled Veteran-Owned Businesses, RAND RESEARCH REPORT 322 (2013), available at: 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR322/RAND_RR322.pdf. 
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other programs, which conveyed the appearance of higher priority; and (2) differences 
between permissive SDVOSB set-aside language and the mandatory set-aside language 
for other programs, which made DOD buyers choose between prohibitive uncertainty and 
certainty.   
 
The second barrier category, concerned the fundamental misunderstanding by service-
disabled veteran business owners at large that the SDVOSB Program’s goals and set-
asides constitute a government guarantee of contracted work for veterans in return on 
some initial start-up investment.  “[M]any did not understand that the SDVOSB 
procurement goals are not mandatory and are not guaranteed. . . . The widely publicized 3 
percent goal raised the expectations of many of these SDVOSBs that they would receive 
federal business, and they invested in their companies and in bids accordingly.”35  What 
Cox and Moore found was that many veterans perceived the SDVOSB as a business 
development program that was suitable for transitioning veterans or business start-ups, 
and would help them get both the business and the experience in Federal and defense 
contracting.  
 
The third barrier category concerned limited access to SDVOSB Program support and 
information about the procurement process.  Though the FAR speaks of “assistance” for 
SDVOSBs by contracting agencies through set-asides and goals, Cox and Moore found 
that actual assistance in winning contracts was generally not provided by DOD 
Contracting Officers. In fact, Cox and Moore described the prospects of having to 
provide such assistance as a deterrent to DOD buyers against doing business with 
SDVOSBs.  Rather, most meaningful assistance was reportedly provided by Procurement 
Technical Assistance Centers (PTACs), which are funded by the Defense Logistics 
Agency (DLA) under cooperative agreements with state or local organizations.
36
  Cox 
                                                 
35 Amy G. Cox and Nancy Y. Moore, Improving Federal and Department of Defense Use of Service-
Disabled Veteran-Owned Businesses, RAND Research Report 322 (2013), 
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR322/RAND_RR322.pdf 
36 See generally 10 U.S.C. § 2411-19 (2013) for the Procurement Technical Assistance Program’s statutory 
authority.    
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and Moore suggested that DOD buyers were rejecting many SDVOSBs as risky due to 
“lack of knowledge and prior experience in federal contracting.”37   
 
In addition to SDVOSB Program-specific challenges, SDVOSBs were also found to face 
information barriers typical of other small and non-traditional suppliers: “These included 
the inherent complexities of the FAR and of the federal bidding process, a lack of 
sufficient federal educational and networking opportunities, a lack of communication 
from key contracting personnel, the slow federal processes for award decisions and 
making final payments, insufficient knowledge among SDVOSBs about their chances of 
winning a bid, the risk of wasting resources on developing a bid that was likely to go to 
an incumbent or another established supplier or of investing in a bid that was 
subsequently cancelled, and the possibility of being in an emerging industry that does not 
fit existing NAICS [North American Industrial Classification] categories.” 38  (NAICS 
codes are assigned to each contract solicitation for use in market research across 
industries as well as determinations whether a firm is small by reference to NAICS-based 
business size standards, while other codes, Product Service Codes/Federal Supply Codes 
(PSCs/FSCs) are used to identify what is actually bought.
39
)   According to Cox and 
Moore, to overcome these barriers, SDVOSBs had to partner with established 
government contractors, hire personnel experienced in the procurement process, invest in 
learning procurement rules, as well as cater to the needs of byers and end users.  
 
The last academic critique of the Federal and DOD SDVOSB Programs came in 
McGann’s 2014 Veterans Law Review article Benign Neglect: Veteran-Owned Small 
Business in Federal Procurement Today.
40
 While calling for a VOSB preference 
                                                 
37 Amy G. Cox and Nancy Y. Moore, Improving Federal and Department of Defense Use of Service-
Disabled Veteran-Owned Businesses, RAND RESEARCH REPORT 322 (2013),  
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/research_reports/RR300/RR322/RAND_RR322.pdf.  
38 Id. 
39 See Timothy Bunting, Play It Again, Sam: Taking Another Look at How Supplies and Services Are 
Classified, 42 PUB. CONT. L. J. 549 (2013). 
40 Kelly McGann, Benign Neglect: Veteran-Owned Small Business in Federal Procurement Today, 6 
VETERANS L. REV. 187 (2014). 
 13 
regardless of disability, McGann again raised the entrenchment concerns regarding the 
SDVOSB Program.
41
  She argued that the SDV status certification rules are at once too 
burdensome, too vulnerable to fraud, and too exclusionary of the neediest disabled 
veterans.  McGann likewise predicted that contract awards “based on any particular 
[SDVOSB] ‘status’” would soon be viewed as an unfair benefit and an undue burden on 
the competitive procurement market.  She did, however, credit the VA’s 2006 Veterans 
First set-asides program which gave SDVOSBs first priority among other categories for 
VA’s record of persistent goal achievement.  She, therefore, called for replicating it 
within the DOD: “DOD has a vast contracting budget along with firsthand knowledge of 
veterans sacrifice and skill-sets.  Further, DOD’s livelihood depends on encouraging 
military service from future veterans; preferential treatment for veteran entrepreneurship 
is one method to encourage service.”42 
 
The common feedback from these 5 studies was that, despite eloquent policy 
statements to the contrary, Federal and DOD SDVOSB Programs were not actually 
designed to help disabled veterans (especially transitioning veterans of recent wars) 
build businesses through government contracting or to provide SDVs viable 
opportunities to be part of the DOD total force.  To be sure, the Programs’ design 
made those objectives theoretically possible, but not preferred or likely.  Instead, as 
the 5 assessments concluded, the Programs’ design: (1) heavily favored entrenchment of 
already-successful SDVOSBs who could have likely got government  contracts without 
the Program, to the possible exclusion of newer or niche SDVOSBs; (2) sowed actual or 
potential confusion for government buyers and SDVOSBs alike because of discretionary 
language in laws and regulations that conflicted with other public policies such as 
competition, fairness, or business development; and (3) fostered actual or potential 
disillusionment with the SDVOSB Program.  The consensus among those assessments 
was that one or more of these design flaws would render achievement of the 3 percent 
goal problematic.    
                                                 
41 Kelly McGann, Benign Neglect: Veteran-Owned Small Business in Federal Procurement Today, 6 
VETERANS L. REV. 187 (2014). 




Despite the 10-year, 5-study refrain of “entrenchment, confusion, disillusionment,” no 
study to date suggested fundamental reforms to the SDVOSB Program so as to reduce or 
eliminate those three challenges.  It is what this study intends to do by applying 
performance management aspects of contract management theory to the question of 
SDVOSB contracting.  This study attempts to examine the research problem of the 
paradox between real goal achievement success and the predictions of program 
malfunction in relation to the SDVOSB Program.   
 
In addition to the above review of prior academic assessments, this study includes an 
analytical examination of the theoretical foundations of effective program design based 
on the Cohen-Eimicke Contract Management Performance Model in relation to the 
current SDVOSB Program design (such as that design is shaped by different 
policymakers).  Thus, this study addresses three research questions below: 
 
(1) Can the SDVOSB Program’s operations, successes, and challenges be better 
explained in terms of the generally accepted Cohen-Eimicke Contract Management 
Performance Model (inputs, process, outputs, and outcome)? 
 
(2) Is broad and unguided individual-level Contracting Officer discretion the 
right mechanism to support SDVOSB participation in Defense, Navy, and Marine 
Corps contracting? 
 
(3) Can FAR Part 13 Simplified Acquisitions positively influence Program 
outcomes?  
 
This study’s research hypothesis is that the Federal/DOD/DON SDVOSB 
Procurement Program’s design(s) overlooked the issues of performance 
management and contracting capacity necessary to achieve the systemic, veteran-
centric outcomes cited by Program architects and proponents at the reasons for its 
creation and continuation.  This design flaw prioritizes the 3 percent goal above other 
 15 
priorities, such as helping the greatest possible number of SDVOSBs, ensuring that DOD 
contracting is a viable path for veteran self-employment, achieving SDVOSB community 
support, bringing new entrants to DOD procurement, and meeting moral and 
rehabilitative obligations to SDVs.   
 
To explore this hypothesis, this study first defines what would constitute an effective 
performance design for a socio-economic contracting program as a matter of contract 
management theory. Next, this study applies this theoretical framework to the historical, 
legal, and policy developments in Program rules in order to create a comprehensive 
taxonomy of Program design reflecting the priorities and actions of different policy 
designers.  This study then validates the understanding of this design taxonomy by 
analyzing data from government databases such as the Federal Procurement Data 
System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG), the Veterans Administration, and System for 
Award Management SAM).  The purpose of data analysis is to see if the Program 
operates as actually designed.  To the extent the research hypothesis is substantiated, this 
study would then propose veteran-centric performance management realignments of the 
Program through new contractors’ most suitable tool, Simplified Acquisition Procedures 
(SAP), including targeted SDVOSB SAP set-asides.
43
   
 
                                                 
43 For discussion of SAP suitability for new contractors, see the original SAP creation proposal in DOD 
ACQUISITION LAW ADVISORY PANEL, Streamlining Defense Acquisition Laws, Executive Summary: Report 
of the DOD Acquisition Law Advisory Panel, AD-A264919 (January 1993).   For purposes of this study, 
Far Part 13 SAP contracts include contracts capped at the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT) 
(originally set at $100,000 and raised to $150,000 for non-emergency, domestic procurements) as well as 
certain commercial item contracts capped at the Commercial Item SAP threshold, formerly known as the 
Commercial Items Test Program threshold (originally set at $5 million and later raised to $6.5 million).  
These thresholds were in effect during the time period studied.       
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III. THEORETICAL FOUNDATIONS OF EFFECTIVE PROGRAM 
DESIGN: APPLYING THE COHEN-EIMICKE CONTRACT 
MANAGEMENT PERFORMANCE MODEL TO SOCIO-
ECONOMIC CONTRACTING. 
In their 2008 modern classic The Responsible Contract Manager, Cohen and Eimicke 
classify contracting programs’ performance measurements according to four types of 
measures: input(s), process(es), output(s), and outcome(s).
44
   
 
Inputs typically concern program resources, such as “dollars appropriated and allocated, . 
. . length of time committed to the problem,” involvement of other organizations, etc.45 
“Input measures are frequently criticized because they tell you only how hard you are 
trying to do something about a problem or the extent of your commitment to reach a 
particular goal. . . . Input measures tell you very little about how well you are doing in 
reaching the objective – they measure effort much better than they assess results. But 
input measures should not be ignored. They provide an important barometer of the scope 
of activity and of the present and future demand on overall resources, serve as surrogates 
of the organization’s priorities, and often reflect the organization’s customer preferences 
as well.”46  In socio-economic contracting programs, performance is typically measured 
by reference to statutory Small Business Act goals (or SBA-negotiated goals) 
establishing that target small businesses receive a certain percentage of an agency’s 
                                                 
44 STEVEN COHEN AND WILLIAM EIMICKE, THE RESPONSIBLE CONTRACT MANAGER: PROTECTING THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST IN AN OUTSOURCED WORLD (PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND CHANGE) (Georgetown 
University Press, 2008).  For reception of this book, see Amanda M. Girth, Strengthening Contract 
Management Capacity to Ensure Accountability, 6 JOURNAL OF PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION RESEARCH AND 
THEORY, Issue 3, 795-799 (2014), available at : http://jpart.oxfordjournals.org/content/24/3/795.short; M. 
Ernita Joaquin, Book Review of The Responsible Contract Manager: Protecting the Public Interest in an 
Outsourced World, 23 GOVERNANCE: AN INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF POLICY, ADMINISTRATION, AND 
INSTITUTIONS, no. 1, 195-198 (2010), available at: http://digitalscholarship.unlv.edu/sea_fac_articles/393;  
Anthony Filipovitch, Book Review of The Responsible Contract Manager: Protecting the Public Interest in 
an Outsourced World, 39 NONPROFIT AND VOLUNTARY SECTOR QUARTERLY, no. 2, 373-375 (April 2010).  
This book is also used in the Naval Postgraduate School contract management curricula.   
45 STEVEN COHEN AND WILLIAM EIMICKE, THE RESPONSIBLE CONTRACT MANAGER: PROTECTING THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST IN AN OUTSOURCED WORLD (PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND CHANGE) (Georgetown 
University Press, 2008). 
46 Id. at 152. 
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contracts or subcontracts spending.  Inputs may also include training courses or number 




The second performance measurement, process, or steps involved in production of goods 
and services, is a function of total quality management (TQM). “Measurement of those 
activities facilitates organizational learning and improvement. Process measures include 
the delineation and definition of specific work steps, measures of the amount of time it 
takes to perform specific tasks, error rates, and similar indicators. Requiring 
organizational units to report process measures can signal government’s concern for the 
quality and efficiency of an organization’s internal operations and can compel attention to 
these fundamental management issues.” 48   In socio-economic contracting programs, 
process measures would concern contracting tools such as set-asides or steps in 
publicizing contract opportunities and market research.   
 
The third performance measurement category is output measures, which “seek to quantify 
the amount of work accomplished with the inputs or resources provided. Output measures 
can seek to measure quantity, quality, or both. Typical output measures include 
customers or clients served, facility condition and cleanliness, miles of road paved, . . . or 
number of products sold. . . . Utilizing a select number of indicators that have a direct 
impact on performance (particularly for customers and funding agencies) leads to a 
successful performance measurement system.”49  A typical output measure for a socio-
economic contracting program would be the number of target small businesses that 
benefitted from the program, or a number of contracts awarded through the program.   
 
Finally, there are the outcome- or impact-based measures, which assess whether the 
desired state (e.g., greater overall economic opportunity for disabled veterans or a more 
                                                 
47 STEVEN COHEN AND WILLIAM EIMICKE, THE RESPONSIBLE CONTRACT MANAGER: PROTECTING THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST IN AN OUTSOURCED WORLD (PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND CHANGE) 153 (Georgetown 
University Press, 2008).   
48 Id.  
49 Id. at 153-154 
 18 
SDVOSB-friendly contracting market) is being achieved. Outcome measures are 
notoriously hard to pinpoint and identify, however.  Overall, “the function of 
performance management remains the same: What are we trying to do, and are we 
succeeding in doing it?”50 
 
                                                 
50 STEVEN COHEN AND WILLIAM EIMICKE, THE RESPONSIBLE CONTRACT MANAGER: PROTECTING THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST IN AN OUTSOURCED WORLD (PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND CHANGE) 155 (Georgetown 
University Press, 2008). 
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IV. UNDERSTANDING THE PERFORMANCE TAXONOMY OF 
THE SDVOSB PROGRAM DESIGN. 
The current DOD SDVOSB Program has been shaped by multiple policymakers and 
stakeholders, including Presidential Administrations, Congress, the SBA, the FAR 
Council, the GAO, Federal courts, and veteran advocacy groups.  As described more in 
detail below, it was originally intended and proposed to be designed as a business 
development program like the Section 8(a) Program for small disadvantaged businesses 
(SDBs).   
 
Under Section 8(a) of the Small Business Act, the SBA is authorized and directed to 
provide business development assistance to small disadvantaged businesses (SDBs).  
This assistance includes a tailored business development plans, pool of contract 
requirements “accepted into” the program for note more than 7 years for sole source and 
competitive set-asides, management and technical advice, agency goals, and other 
measures.  Sole source awards can be made based on such business development plan 
even if there is another willing, but more successful 8(a).  The assistance mix would 
change as the firms established past performance and progressed towards program 
graduation.  The SBA reports to Congress annually on assistance metrics, including 
number of firms assisted and agencies’ spending goal achievement.51 Federal and DOD 
Contracting Officers make non-competitive 8(a) awards with SBA direction or 
concurrence, and may not rededicate 8(a) Program contracts for other businesses without 
SBA approval.  In the Cohen-Eimicke framework, this assures a “floor” in terms of 
program input, i.e. spending.
 52
 
   
                                                 
51 See generally 15 U.S.C. § 637(a) (2014); 13 CFR Part 124 (2014), U.S. SMALL BUSINESS 
ADMINISTRATION (SBA) OFFICE OF BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT, STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE (SOP) 
80 05 3A (2008), available at: https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/sops/serv_sops_sop80053a.pdf; U.S. 
SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (SBA), About the 8(a) Program (2014), available at: 
https://www.sba.gov/content/about-8a-business-development-program. 
52 Cf.  STEVEN COHEN AND WILLIAM EIMICKE, THE RESPONSIBLE CONTRACT MANAGER: PROTECTING THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST IN AN OUTSOURCED WORLD (PUBLIC MANAGEMENT AND CHANGE) (Georgetown 
University Press, 2008).  
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Further, the 8(a) Program increases the outcome of business development of 
disadvantaged entrepreneurs through a firm(output)-focused process there the SBA 
assumes much of the responsibility for picking firms in need of contract awards, leaving 
Contracting Officers to focus on better requirements definition and contract 
administration.  Instead, the SDVOSB Program features have morphed over time into a 3 
percent goal-driven, input-based design that relies for process on individual-level 
discretion of DOD Contracting Officers to reserve competitive or sole source contract 
awards for SDVOSBs whenever the contracting officer determines such awards are 
needed.  In essence, a Contracting Officer bears an undefined moral responsibility for 
supporting SDVOSBs while assuming definite risk of performance failure should the 
SDVOSB firm’s capabilities fail.  Neither the quantity nor the business development 
needs of outputs, that is, number of assisted firms, are used as strategic guides for 
exercise of Contracting Officers’ discretion at the individual level, DOD-wide, or 
military department-wide.   The end result is a long history of missed opportunities to 
align Program design with its mission, where the common thread among most policy 
initiatives was to leave the business development power with the wrong people: 
individual Contracting Officers. 
 
A. ORIGINAL DESIGN INTENT FOR THE SDVOSB PROGRAM: 
BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT OUTCOME. 
Veteran advocates have long argued for a Section 8(a)-style program for SDVOSBs. In 
November 1998, the SBA submitted to Congress the report of its Veterans Affairs Task 
Force on Entrepreneurship, which included a “high priority” recommendation for “a 
regulation classifying veteran-owned businesses as a ‘socially and economically 
disadvantaged business group.’”53   
 
On January 14, 1999, the Congressional Commission on Service members and Veterans 
Transition Assistance issued its final report, which recommended admission of 
SDVOSBs owned by veterans with majority-disabled ratings in order to “increase 
                                                 
53 145 CONG. REC. 21,168 (Sept. 9, 1999) (Statement of Rep. James H. Talent on the Veterans 
Entrepreneurship and Small Business Development Act of 1999).    
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opportunities for veterans who are, or want to become, small business owners.”54  That 
report emphasized the disabled veterans’ need for 8(a) “special assistance” due to “costs 
and impediments that are not factor for their nondisabled competitors.”55  The report also 
found that veterans “earned . . . through their service” a goaling “incentive” for Federal 
agencies such as DOD to do business with VOSBs and SDVOSBs.
56
  Despite the 
excellent fit of this design to the realities of contracting process and SDV needs, neither 
Congress nor the Executive Branch expressly adopted it.    
B. LEGISLATIVE ESTABLISHMENT OF INPUT-FOCUSED DESIGN.  
The first SDVOSB Program design was supposedly adopted on January 2, 1974, upon 
enactment of Public Law 93-237 with what was known as the “Anti-Discriminatory 
Amendment” to Section 4 of the Small Business Act, codified as 15 USC §633(4) (2014); 
that Amendment required that “the Small Business Administration shall give special 
consideration to veterans of the Armed Forces of the United States and their survivors or 
dependents.”  No significant contracts flowed to veterans from that measure.   
 
The next significant reform came on December 2, 1997, with enactment of the Small 
Business Reauthorization Act of 1997, Public Law 105-135.  The Act’s Title VII, 
Service-Disabled Veterans, contained several measures intended to “(1) to foster 
enhanced entrepreneurship among eligible veterans by providing increased opportunities; 
(2) to vigorously promote the legitimate interests of small business concerns owned and 
controlled by eligible veterans; and (3) to ensure that those concerns receive fair 
consideration in purchases made by the Federal Government.” 57   These measures 
included Section 703 direction to the SBA to study and report “the percentage, and dollar 
                                                 
54 CONGRESSIONAL COMMISSION ON SERVICE MEMBERS AND VETERANS TRANSITION ASSISTANCE, REPORT 
OF THE COMMISSION 9 (1999), available at: 
http://www.tricare.mil/tma/ocmo/download/Exec_Summary/ES-
11_ReportCongCommServMembersVetsTransitionAssistance.pdf. 
55 Id. at 147. 
56 Id. at 147. 
57 Small Business Reauthorization Act of 1997, Pub. L. No. 105-135, Title VII, § 701 (1997). 
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value, of Federal contracts” awarded to SDVOSBs over the previous 5 years, and Section 
707 direction to the SBA “to take such actions as may be necessary” to ensure that 
SDVOSBs “have access to programs established under the Small Business Act” 
providing “business development assistance” and other help.  Thus, while contracting and 
other business development assistance was mentioned, it seemed be tied to inputs, not 
outputs or outcome.   
 
The transition to explicit input-based design occurred in 1999 with Public Law 106-50, 
the Veterans Entrepreneurship and Small Business Development Act of 1999.  That law 
amended the Small Business Act to create a 3 percent minimum prime contracting and 
subcontracting government-wide SDVOSB goals as part of other government-wide small 
business goals.
58
  The law also provided for veterans’ business development entities 
within the SBA, the VA, and the stand-alone National Veterans Business Development 
Corporation (NVBDC).   
 
On December 16, 2003, the Veterans Benefits Act of 2003 became Public Law 108-183.  
Section 308
59
 of that law, codified at 15 U.S.C. § 657f, gave Federal agencies the tools to 
achieve the 3 percent goal by amending the Small Business Act to authorize competitive 
and sole source set-asides for SDVOSBs. The original 2003 set-aside authority (with 
thresholds since adjusted for inflation to $6 million for manufacturing NAICS buys and 
$3.5 million for other buys) provided:   
(a)  Sole source contracts. In accordance with this section, a contracting officer 
may award a sole source contract to any small business concern owned and 
controlled by service-disabled veterans if— (1) such concern is determined to be 
a responsible contractor with respect to performance of such contract opportunity 
and the contracting officer does not have a reasonable expectation that 2 or more 
small business concerns owned and controlled by service-disabled veterans will 
                                                 
58 Veterans Entrepreneurship and Small Business Development Act of 1999, Pub. L. No. 106-50, § 502, 
codified in the Small Business Act at 15 U.S.C. §644(g) (1999). 
59 Veterans Benefits Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-183, §308, codified in the Small Business Act as 15 
U.S.C. §657f (2003). 
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submit offers for the contracting opportunity;  (2) the anticipated award price of 
the contract (including options) will not exceed— (A) $5,000,000, in the case of a 
contract opportunity assigned a standard industrial classification code for 
manufacturing; or (B) $3,000,000, in the case of any other contract opportunity; 
and (3) in the estimation of the contracting officer, the contract award can be 
made at a fair and reasonable price.  (b)  Restricted competition. In accordance 
with this section, a contracting officer may award contracts on the basis of 
competition restricted to small business concerns owned and controlled by 
service-disabled veterans if the contracting officer has a reasonable expectation 
that not less than 2 small business concerns owned and controlled by service-





C. THE CONGRESSIONAL COMPROMISE OF 2003: MISSED 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR TYING SDVOSB PROGRAM INPUTS TO BUSINESS 
DEVELOPMENT OUTCOMES FOR SERVICE-DISABLED VETERANS.   
Two provisions of Veterans Benefits Act of 2003, Public Law 108-183 (which remained 
law but which did not become U.S. Code sections), as well as related legislative history, 
provide some insight into the legislative intent for the objectives of the SDVOSB 
Procurement Program as well as the choice of means to accomplish them.  Collectively, 
these authorities show that Congress intended the SDVOSB Program to be business 
development in nature, but chose not to mandate this intent.  Rather, Congress 
compromised the clarity and strength of this intent in order to accommodate concerns 
over the commingling of SDVOSBs and SDBs into one 8(a) Program or creation of a 
rival 8(a)-style Program. 
 
Section 101 of the Veterans Benefits Act indicates that Congress intended the SDVOSB 
Program to be in its nature a business development program:  
SEC. 101. FINDINGS. Congress finds the following: (1) Veterans of the United 
States Armed Forces have been and continue to be vital to the small business 
enterprises of the United States. (2) In serving the United States, veterans often 
                                                 
60 15 U.S.C. § 657f (2003). 
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faced great risks to preserve the American dream of freedom and prosperity. (3) 
The United States has done too little to assist veterans, particularly service-
disabled veterans, in playing a greater role in the economy of the United States by 
forming and expanding small business enterprises. (4) Medical advances and new 
medical technologies have made it possible for service-disabled veterans to play a 
much more active role in the formation and expansion of small business 
enterprises in the United States. (5) The United States must provide additional 
assistance and support to veterans to better equip them to form and expand small 
business enterprises, thereby enabling them to realize the American dream that 




Section 102 addressed tools to achieve these objectives.  Section 102 language shows that 
Congress designed the SDVOSB Program to operate not as a tailored business 
development program such as the Section 8(a) Program for Small Disadvantaged 
Businesses (which has the highest goals and strongest set-aside mandates of all 
socioeconomic categories), but as a form of additional assistance to SDVOSB firms of 
various levels of sophistication:   
SEC. 102. PURPOSE. The purpose of this Act is to expand existing and establish 
new assistance programs for veterans who own or operate small businesses. This 
Act accomplishes this purpose by—(1) expanding the eligibility for certain small 
business assistance programs to include veterans; (2) directing certain 
departments and agencies of the United States to take actions that enhance small 
business assistance to veterans; and (3) establishing new institutions to provide 
small business assistance to veterans or to support the institutions that provide 
such assistance.
62
   
 
Legislative history shows that Congress approached the SDVOSB Program design from 
the perspective of compromise, rather than the perspective of design effectiveness and 
cohesion.  In the House Report 108-142, Part I, on H.R. 1460, Veterans Entrepreneurship 
                                                 
61 Veterans Benefits Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-183, § 101 (2003). 
62 Veterans Benefits Act of 2003, Pub. L. No. 108-183, § 102 (2003).  
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and Benefits Improvement Act of 2003 (June 5, 2003), the House Committee on Veterans 
Affairs admitted that service-disabled veterans require special business development 
assistance in terms of accessing government contracts, but expressly rejected the 
recommendation to let them tap into an already-existing 8(a) assistance framework: 
The Committee notes the 1999 report of the bipartisan Congressional 
Commission on Servicemembers and Veterans Transition Assistance 
recommended that ``Special assistance, such as lending opportunities and access 
to a disadvantaged business development program like SBA's 8(a) program is 
needed to support disabled veteran entrepreneurs.'' H.R. 1460, as amended, does 
not make service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses part of the 8(a) 
program, but it does give them sole source/set-aside-type contracting 
opportunities on a discretionary basis.  The Commission also concluded that, 
``Disabled-veteran entrepreneurs require additional assistance because these 
business owners encounter costs and impediments that are not factors for their 
non-disabled competitors'' and ``As a matter of fundamental fairness, Congress 
should accord veterans a full opportunity to participate in the economic system 
that their service sustains.” 63 
 
What really concerned the Committee was the Federal government’s failure to meet the 
Public Law 106-50 3 percent goaling floor four years since its passage.  In the wake of 
the June 2003 hearings, the Committee reached the consensus with the Bush Presidential 
Administration that a set-aside tool “is needed as government-wide implementation of the 
3 percent goal has been ‘abysmal.’”64  Thus, Congress tied the set-asides process to 
spending inputs in the parts of the 2003 law that were codified in Title 15, Chapter 14A 
of the U.S. Code as part of the Small Business Act, while preserving the SDVOSB 
Program’s business development intent in the parts of 2003 law that were to become 
notes to U.S. Code sections and not the Code sections themselves.  As described below, 
                                                 
63 H.R. REP. 108-142, Part I, H.R. 1460, Veterans Entrepreneurship and Benefits Improvement Act of 2003 
(June 5, 2003). 
64 Id. 
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this approach spawned years of legal, contracting, and managerial conflicts and 
confusion.  
 
D. THE FAR COUNCIL’S AND THE SBA’S REJECTIONS OF OUTCOME-
FOCUSED OR OUTPUT-FOCUSED DESIGNS FOR THE SDVOSB PROGRAM. 
Like Congress, the SBA and the FAR Council adopted input-focused Program designs in 
regulatory history.  On March 23, 2005, the FAR Council issued the final FAR rule on 
the SDVOSB Procurement Program.
65
 The final rule asserted that the SDVOSB set-
asides were not intended to build SDVOSB firms, but simply to provide them with some 
form of preferential contracting treatment: “It is important to note that the 8(a) Program is 
a business development program. While the 8(a) Program offers a broad scope of 
assistance to socially and economically disadvantaged small businesses, the SDVOSB 
Program strictly pertains to benefits in Federal contracting.”66  As mentioned above, the 
Final Rule also amended the purpose of FAR Part 13, Simplified Acquisition Procedures 
to cover SDVOSB contracting opportunities.   
 
The SBA issued its final SDVOSB Program rule on the same day, March 23, 2005.
67
 In 
that final rule, the SBA addressed “the general nature of the SDVO SBC Program” in 
terms of business development assistance.  Rebuffing requests that SDVOSBs be allowed 
to tap the mentor-protégé assistance which the SBA makes available to 8(a) firms, the 
SBA stated: 
SBA has reviewed this issue thoroughly and believes that the SDVO SBC 
Program, unlike the 8(a) BD Program, is not developmental in nature. Rather, it 
is the result of a recognized need to increase the participation of ‘‘established’’ 
SDVO SBCs in the Federal marketplace. The first attempt, Public Law 106–50, 
                                                 
65 FEDERAL ACQUISITION REGULATION (FAR) COUNCIL, Procurement Program for Service-Disabled 
Veteran-Owned Small Businesses, Final Rule, 70 Fed. Reg. 14950 (March 23, 2005), 
http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2005-03-23/pdf/05-5656.pdf.  
66 Id. 
67 U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (SBA), SBA Regulations, Government Contracting Programs, 
70 Fed. Reg. 14523-14529 (March 23, 2005), available: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2005-03-
23/pdf/05-5466.pdf. 
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instituted the 3% goal for SDVO SBCs. When data indicated that the desired 
results were not being achieved, Public Law 108–183 was enacted. Public Law 
108–183 established tools (a restricted competition and sole source authority) for 
Contracting Officers to use to reach that segment of the small business 
population. Although there is no prohibition against SBA establishing an SDVO 
SBC Mentor-Protégé Program, at this juncture, SBA prefers to wait and see if 
implementation of the procurement tools in Public Law 108–183 will allow 
contracting activities to reach their SDVO SBC goals. SBA notes that there is no 
prohibition for SDVO SBCs, when eligible, to participate in the Mentor-Protégé 




The SBA rulemaking comments did not provide any source reference for the 
“established” businesses quote.  
 
E. THE REGULATORY DESIGN OF CONTRACTING OFFICERS’ 
DISCRETION FOR SDVOSB SET ASIDE PROCESS.  
The actual SBA and FAR regulatory provisions originally contained no alignment 
between set-asides process and any other Program performance metrics, but were only 
exhorting breadth of market research.  From 2004 and until 2011, the texts of the FAR 
and the SBA regulations did not require that Contracting Officers consider SDVOSB set-
aside prior to conducting the mandatory market research for mandatory considerations of 
small business set-asides.  FAR §19.1405(a) (2007)
69
 provided only that the Contracting 
Officers “may” consider such set-asides, while the SBA Regulations at 13 C.F.R. 
§125.19 (2007)
70
 provided that they “should” consider them along with HUBZone and 
8(a) set-asides (Women-Owned SBs were added later) and before regular small business 
set-asides. In acquisitions above the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT), HUBZone 
firms at the time would take precedence over SDVOSBs. The FAR further provided that 
                                                 
68 U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (SBA), SBA Regulations, Government Contracting Programs, 
70 Fed. Reg. 14523-14529 (March 23, 2005), available at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2005-03-
23/pdf/05-5466.pdf. 
69 FAR §19.1405(a) (2007). 
70 13 C.F.R. § 125.19 (2007). 
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a contracting officer “may set-aside acquisitions exceeding the micro-purchase threshold 
for competition restricted to [SDVOSBs when the Rule of Two is met].  The contracting 
officer shall consider service-disabled veteran-owned small business set-asides before 
considering service-disabled veteran-owned small business sole source awards.”71      
 
In 2011, the FAR and SBA Regulations strengthened market research duties and aligned 
set-asides to goals. The SBA amended its regulations on February 4, 2011 and made 
market research for purposes of considering SDVOSB set-asides mandatory:  “after 
conducting market research, the contracting officer shall first consider a set-aside or sole 
source award (if the sole source award is permitted by statute or regulation) under the 
8(a) BD, HUBZone, SDVO SBC or WOSB programs before setting aside the 
requirement as a small business set-aside. There is no order of precedence among the 8(a) 
BD, HUBZone, SDVO SBC or WOSB programs. The contracting officer must document 
the contract file with the rationale used to support the specific set-aside, including the 
type and extent of market research conducted.”72 The FAR amendments provided for 
parity and also expressly mandated consideration of the SDVOSB Program and other 
socio-economic programs before proceeding with regular small business set-asides above 
SAT.  The FAR Council defined it as follows: “FAR 19.203(d) was added to include 
language consistent with 13 CFR 125.2(f)(2)(ii) regarding the minimum elements a 
contracting officer should examine when choosing a socioeconomic program: The results 
of market research and progress in fulfilling agency small business goals.”73 
 
Since early 2011, the SBA and FAR regulatory texts require mandatory (“shall” 
language) consideration of SDVOSB set-asides for open market contracts above the SAT, 
and authorize discretionary consideration (“may” language) for Indefinite-Delivery 
Vehicle (IDV) contracts and orders as well as open market contracts not exceeding SAT. 
Taking into account the reforms adopted in the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Public 
                                                 
71 FAR §19.1405(a) (2007). 
72 13 C.F.R. § 125.19(b)(2)(i) (2011). 
73 FAR COUNCIL, Federal Acquisition Regulation: Socioeconomic Program Parity (March 2, 2012), 
available at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2012-03-02/html/2012-4488.htm. 
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Law 111-240 (Sept. 24, 2010),
74
 FAR § 19.203 (2011) outlines three general rules of 
precedence for Open Market procurements.   
 
First, “[s]mall business set-asides have priority over acquisitions using full and open 
competition.”75  In other words, set-asides always take priority over unrestricted buys. 
 
Second, “[t]here is no order of precedence” among the four small business 
socioeconomic programs: the 8(a) Program, the HUBZone Program, the Service–
Disabled Veteran–Owned Small Business (SDVOSB) Procurement Program, or the 
Women–Owned Small Business (WOSB) Program.76    
 
The third rule concerns the choice between small business set-asides and small business 
socio-economic set-asides. Above-SAT buys are to be considered for socio-economic 
programs first, before considering them for small business set-asides.  However, the 
parity between those programs is still subject to the 8(a) claw-back priority: “However, if 
a requirement [above SAT] has been accepted by the SBA under the 8(a) Program, it 
must remain in the 8(a) Program unless the SBA agrees to its release in accordance with 
13 CFR parts 124, 125, and 126.”77  Below-SAT buys are different, in that they are to be 
“exclusively reserve[d] . . . for small business concerns,” which merely “does not 
preclude the contracting officer from awarding a contract to a small business under the 
8(a) Program, HUBZone Program, SDVOSB Program, or WOSB Program.”78 
 
The choice “which socioeconomic program to use” is subject to guided discretion, in that 
“the contracting officer should consider, at a minimum -- (1) results of market research 
that was done to determine if there are socioeconomic firms capable of satisfying the 
                                                 
74 Small Business Jobs Act of 2010, Pub. L. 111-240 (Sept. 24, 2010). 





agency's requirement; and (2) agency progress in fulfilling its small business goals.”79  It 
was left unclear in the text, however, whether these criteria apply below the SAT.  
  
F. THE BUSH-ERA INPUT-FOCUSED DESIGN: EO 13360 AND DOD 
STRATEGIC PLANS.  
The Bush-era initiative to improve management of the SDVOSB Program re-emphasized 
Program outcomes, but ultimately aligned the process with inputs.  The October 20, 
2004, Executive Order 13360, Providing Opportunities for Service-Disabled Veteran 
Businesses to Increase Their Federal Contracting and Subcontracting,
80
 had two overall 
messages.  
 
The first message was the SDVOSB Program must be administered by the buying 
agencies in the manner that increases contracting opportunities; the Order sent that 
message without expressly mentioning business development. EO 13360’s Preamble 
cited as its purpose “to strengthen opportunities in Federal contracting for service-
disabled veteran businesses.”81  EO 13360’s Section 1 announced: “America honors the 
extraordinary service rendered to the United States by veterans with disabilities incurred 
or aggravated in the line of duty during active service with the armed forces. Heads of 
agencies shall provide the opportunity for service-disabled veteran businesses to 
significantly increase the Federal contracting and subcontracting of such businesses.”82   
 
The second message was that the SDVOSB Program, scoped as including the 3 percent 
goal and the set-aside authorities, will now become mandatory.  Section 1 continued in 
mandatory (“shall”) language: “To achieve that objective [of significantly increased 
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Federal business], agencies shall more effectively implement section 15(g) of the Small 
Business Act (15 U.S.C. 644(g)), which provides that the President must establish a goal 
of not less than 3 percent for participation by service-disabled veteran businesses in 
Federal contracting, and section 36 of that Act (15 U.S.C. 657f), which gives agency 
Contracting Officers the authority to reserve certain procurements for service-disabled 
veteran businesses.” 83  
 
In response to EO 13360, OFPP and SBA Administrators issued a memorandum 
summarizing agency reporting obligations as follows: “the Order requires each agency to: 
(1) develop a strategy to  significantly increase its contracting and subcontracting with 
small businesses owned and  controlled by service-disabled veterans; (2) designate a 
senior-level official to be responsible for  developing and implementing the agency's 
strategy; and (3) report its progress annually to the  Small Business Administration 
(SBA).”84  Along with restating the Order, the memo’s guidance listed “reserve certain 
agency contracts exclusively for service-disabled veteran businesses” as one example of 
actions to include in agency strategies and cautioned of a results-based evaluation.    
DOD’s implementing plans and policies primarily focused on meeting the goals and 
improving the flow of information that may be needed by Contracting Officers to 
favorably exercise their discretion.  Substantive output-based process metrics were 
encouraged, but left to DOD components to generate.   
 
On May 31, 2005, DOD issued its initial 5-year SDVOSB Strategic Plan.  The Plan 
acknowledged the 3 percent goals, but addressed only Fiscal Years 2005 and 2006 with 
specificity.  The Plan contained six elements (objectives) to increase: (1) the number of 
SDVOSB CCR registrants; (2) “training and outreach of acquisition community to 
increase use of sole source and restricted competition,”  including by encouraging DOD 
components “to initiate credible and aggressive metric based sole-source and restricted 
competition awards to SDVOSBs”; (3) “SDVOSB participation in the [DOD] Mentor-
                                                 
83 Id. 
84 OFFICE OF FEDERAL PROCUREMENT POLICY (OFPP) and SBA. Memorandum, Contracting with Service-
Disabled Veterans (2005), available at: 
https://www.sba.gov/offices/headquarters/ogc_and_bd/resources/5526.  
 32 
Protégé Program”; (4) subcontract awards from large primes; (5) “surety bonding 
capacity” for construction and environmental remediation SDVOSBs; and (6) 
enhancements of SDVOSB capabilities and capacities through teaming agreements and 
joint ventures.
85
  The Plan was followed by the April 12, 2007 memorandum from USD 
AT&L Kenneth Krieg encouraging the use of GSA’s SDVOSB Information Technology 
GWAC, and the May 18, 2007, memorandum from the USD AT&L Office in connection 
with the DOD being “significantly short” of the 3 percent goal in Fiscal Years 2005 and 
2006.
 86
  Both memoranda referenced the DOD SDVOSB Strategic Plan.   
 
On June 23, 2007, DOD issued another edition of its SDVOSB Strategic Plan covering 
FY2007 “and out years.”87  The Plan followed the 2005 elements, except that objective 1 
now concerned “more effective use of data and databases to perform market research” for 
SDVOSBs, objective 3 was now the focus on innovative-technology SDVOSBs, and 
objective 5 concerned working with private lenders on surety bonds.   
 
On January 14, 2009, DOD issued its last SDVOSB Strategic Plan to date, effective 
through Fiscal Year 2014.  This Plan followed the prior six-objective structure, except 
that the former objective 3, focus on innovative SDVOSBs, became objective 5, while the 
“communication with stakeholders” became objective 3.88  The Plan also provided that 
“[i]t is incumbent of each DOD agency to aggressively develop its own tactical plan to 
meet the 3 percent goal for prime contracting with SDVOSBs based on its unique product 
mix.”89  Thus, the last DOD Strategic Plans highlighted the importance of output-related 
processes, but did not expressly align the SDVOSB Program metrics to business 
development outcomes.  
                                                 
85 USD AT&L, DOD SDVOSB STRATEGIC PLAN (2005). 
86 USD ATL&L, Memoranda, Service-Disabled Veteran-Owned Small Business Procurement Program 
(April 12, 2007), and GSA GWAC for SDVOSBs in Information Technology (May 18, 2007), available at: 
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87 USD AT&L, DOD SDVOSB STRATEGIC PLAN (2007). 
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G. THE OBAMA-ERA INPUT-FOCUSED DESIGN: EO 13540 AND THE 
INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON VETERANS SMALL BUSINESS 
DEVELOPMENT.  
President Obama left intact EO 13360 and the 2009 DOD Strategic Plan thus far, but the 
Obama Administration has pursued its own approach to SDVOSB contracting.  Again, 
however, the stated assumption of these policies was that inputs are a proxy for the 
business development outcome; therefore, their main thrust was to redirect buyers from 
increasing the number of outputs to finding existing outputs that can receive more inputs.  
Yet again, no output- or outcome-aligned designs were adopted.  Instead of mandates that 
bent or guided the exercise of buyers’ discretion, the Obama initiatives generally pursued 
the three-pronged strategy of: (1) studying the SDVOSB supplier base; (2) making it 
easier for government buyers to exercise their discretion by finding SDVOSB contractors 
already active in the defense market; and (3) removing bureaucratic barriers from the 
procurement process.   
 
On April 26, 2010, President Obama signed Executive Order 13540, Interagency Task 
Force on Veterans Small Business Development, “in order to establish an interagency 
task force to coordinate the efforts of Federal agencies to improve capital, business 
development opportunities, and pre-established Federal contracting goals for small 
business concerns owned and controlled by veterans and service-disabled veterans.”90   
 
On November 1, 2011, the Interagency Task Force (IATF) issued its first Report to the 
President: Empowering Veterans through Entrepreneurship.  That report observed, “By 
increasing the flow of both capital and federal contracting opportunities to veteran-owned 
small businesses, veterans will have more opportunities to build a new business, expand 
an existing business, and hire workers. In many cases, this does not require standing up 
new programs, but instead ensuring that existing programs and resources are more 
                                                 
90 Barack H. Obama, Exec. Order 13,540, Interagency Task Force on Veterans Small Business 
Development (April 26, 2010), available at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/FR-2010-04-29/pdf/2010-
10172.pdf.  The Order finally implemented the requirement of the Military Reservist and Veteran Small 
Business Reauthorization and Opportunity Act of 2008, Pub. L. No. 110-186, § 102 (2008), codified in the 
Small Business Act at 15 U.S.C. §657b(c) (2008), to establish the IATF no later than mid-May 2008. 
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effective in supporting veteran entrepreneurship.”91   The report further stated that “the 
[Obama] Administration has made targeted efforts to specifically enable veterans as 
successful small business owners [such as  . . . i]ncreasing to the highest level ever the 
percentage of federal contracts going to service-disabled veteran-owned small businesses 
in fiscal year 2010” 92  (emphasis in the original).  It recommended identifying and 
removing regulatory barriers to SDVOSB participation, such as common government-
wide and VA SDVOSB certifications, implementation of Small Business Jobs Act 
discretionary set-asides on IDVs, and greater information-sharing between government 
buyers and veteran groups.  The FY2013 National Defense Authorization Act, Public 
Law 112-239, enacted on January 3, 2012,
93
 made statutory goals presumptively binding 
on agencies unless lower goals were justified.   
 
On November 29, 2012, the Task Force issued its second report, Heroes on the Home 
Front: Supporting Veteran Success as Small Business Owners. It recommended three 
actions, resurrecting the SBA’s 2005 limitation of the Program to “established” firms: 
“(1) Create an easier process for Contracting Officers to utilize established SDVOSBs so 
businesses will have greater access to available Federal contracts”; (2) “Create an online 
reference guide for the Federal government contracting community and an educational 
video to support Federal Contracting Officers in how to conduct market research and 
work with SDVOSBs”; and (3) “Identify and share best practices in how agencies 
maximize the effective use of SDVOSBs” so that Contracting Officers are “trained and 
incented to do business with SDVOSBs.”94  The report also commended DOD for being a 
                                                 
91 INTERAGENCY TASK FORCE ON VETERANS SMALL BUSINESS DEVELOPMENT (IATF), Report to the 
President: Empowering Veterans Through Entrepreneurship (Nov. 1, 2011), available at: 
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leader in “[s]treamlining the process for Contracting Officers to use established 
SDVOSBs.”95  The report cited the 2011 and 2012 memoranda of Secretary Leon Panetta 
(first-ever by a Secretary of the Defense) stressing the importance of small business 
(including SDVOSB) goals in management performance, and the DOD OSBP guidance 
recommending the use of the MAXPRAC tool, a giant spreadsheet with contract awards 
data from across DOD that allowed buyers in one DOD component to locate small and 
other socio-economic contractors doing business with another component: “DOD’s 
Office of Small Business Programs and Defense Procurement Acquisition Policy (DPAP) 
issued several directives and guidance to Contracting Officers to (1) utilize market 
research (MAX PRAC) to identify opportunities for small businesses; (2) utilize existing 
MACs, IDIQ contracts and small business set asides to satisfy near term procurement 
opportunities; and (3) maximize small business contracting opportunities below the 
simplified acquisition procedures threshold (SAT) and above the micro-purchase 
threshold, in accordance with FAR 13.003(b)(1).”96  Both reports called for agency-level 
assessments of SDVOSB goal achievement, participation, and barriers.   
 
The so-called MAXPRAC model is essentially a spreadsheet with DOD-wide small 
business contracting data used for finding established small business suppliers.
97
  Thus, 
the Task Force Reports encouraged Contracting Officers to achieve the input goals 
through a process that had the admitted effect of reducing Program outputs. 
 
H. THE EFFECT OF ADMINISTRATIVE AND JUDICIAL PRECEDENTS 
ON THE SDVOSB PROGRAM’S DESIGN.  
The three tribunals with jurisdiction over bid protests, namely, the Government 
Accountability Office (GAO), the Court of Federal Claims (COFC), and the Court of 
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Appeals for the Federal Circuit (CAFC), have their own SDVOSB Program designs 
through precedents.  
 
The GAO adopted a process-focused model that is concerned with ensuring thorough 
participation opportunity for individual outputs.  The courts have adopted what, at first 
glance, appears to be two different process designs: one favoring and one disfavoring 
SDVOSBs.  On closer examination, they are really one inputs-focused design. The 
GAO’s design, originated in three 2007-2008 decisions, concerned the quality and 
thoroughness of market research process and acquisition strategies for the benefit of one 
or two outputs; it did not concern strategic alignment of process with outputs at large.  
 
In the March 28, 2007 decision MCS Portable Restrooms, the GAO interpreted the 
meaning of Contracting Officer’s discretion under the 2005 SBA and FAR SDVOSB 
Program Final Rules to (1) reject SDVOSBs from consideration for set-asides, and (2) 
make sole source awards.  The GAO formulated the following test: “[T]he contracting 
officer ‘may,’ but is not required, to set aside the acquisition for SDVOSBCs, even where 
it is found that two or more SDVOSBCs are interested in submitting bids and award is 
anticipated to be made at a fair market price. However, as indicated above, applicable 
SBA regulations provide that a contracting officer should consider the propriety of setting 
aside an acquisition for SDVOSBCs before proceeding with a small business set-aside 
and it is implicit in this regulation that such consideration be reasonable.”98  Applying 
this test, the GAO required consultation with the SBA as well as consideration of 
incumbency and expression of interest by an SDVOSB outside the formal “sources 
sought” market research process.  The GAO also held that SDVOSB sole sources were 
“permitted any time the contracting officer does not have a reasonable expectation that 
two or more SDVOSBs would submit bids,” not simply where the agency can find 
capable but uninterested SDVOSBs.
99
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In the February 21, 2008 decision IBV, Ltd., the GAO addressed: (1) whether SDVOSB 
set-asides are mandatory, and (2) when must an SDVOSB be considered for a sole 
source.
100
  The GAO held that consideration of SDVOSB set-asides is mandatory: “Prior 
to proceeding with a small business set-aside, a procuring agency is required to make 
reasonable efforts to ascertain whether an SDVOSBC set-aside is appropriate.”101  The 
GAO also announced a four-part process for SDVOSB sole sources under FAR §19.406 
(2008): “While an agency may make a sole-source award to an SDVOSBC, four 
conditions must be met: only one SDVOSBC can satisfy the requirement; where, as here, 
the requirement falls under a nonmanufacturing NAICS code, the anticipated award price 
will not exceed $3 million; the SDVOSBC has been determined responsible with respect 
to performance; and award can be made at a fair and reasonable price.”102 The GAO then 
allowed the contracting officer to disregard an SDVOSB interested in a sole source where 
multiple SDVOSBs demonstrated availability to compete by actually submitting 
proposals, and all of those proposals substantially exceeded statutory sole source cap as 
well as fair market price metrics (lowest non-SDVOSB proposal values, independent 
government estimates, and RFP estimated price).
103
   
 
However, in the May 1, 2008 decision DAV Prime, Inc.,
104
 the GAO expressly reversed 
its holdings in MCS Portable Restrooms and IBV, Ltd. The GAO held there was a duty to 
consider set-asides and no duty to do market research in search of SDVOSBs. However, 
where Federal buyers chose to exercise this discretion, they would now be subject to 
extra scrutiny and GAO precedents: “While there was no requirement that an agency 
consider setting aside a procurement for SDVOSB concerns prior to proceeding with a 
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101 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), IBV, Ltd., B-311244 (2008) (interpreting FAR 
§19.406 (2008), available at: http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/311244.pdf. 
102 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), IBV, Ltd., B-311244 (2008), available at: 
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/311244.pdf. 
103 Id. 
104 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), DAV Prime, Inc., B-311420 (2008), available at: 
http://www.gao.gov/decisions/bidpro/311420.pdf. 
 38 
small business set-aside, if the agency performs an SDVOSB set-aside analysis, the 
conclusions the agency draws from that analysis must be reasonable.”105  Thus, the 2007-
2008 GAO design focused on process for the sake of one or more outputs, but not on 
increasing inputs.   
 
In the February 13, 2012 decision, of Kingdomware Technologies; SDV Technologies, 
LLC,
106
 the GAO permitted a regional installation contracting office of the U.S. Marine 
Corps to avoid an SDVOSB set-aside by means of decreasing the dollar value of a 
reprocurement to below the Simplified Acquisition Threshold (SAT).  The Marine Corps 
accomplished this decrease not only by reducing its needs, but also by actions which at 
least arguably favored more established non-SDVOSB firms as opposed to emerging 
SDVOSBs.  These actions included reducing allowable reimbursement for “training-
related travel costs” in the expectation of offer from firms that won’t need such training 
(including offers from non-SDVOSB firms), and by treating a certain expensive feature 
as an “industry standard” which offerors may be expected to provided cheaper than 
before.
107
  Further, in a footnote, the GAO observed: “Agencies are required to set aside 
acquisitions valued at or below the simplified acquisition threshold for small businesses 
where the agency expects to receive fair and reasonable offers from two or more small 
business concerns, although 8(a), HUBZone, SDVOSB, and woman-owned small 
business set-asides are not “precluded.” 13 C.F.R. § 125.19(b)(1); FAR § 19.203(b).”108 
At the time, the DON overall unquestionably did not meet the SDVOSB statutory goal.  
SDVOSB set-aside would have counted towards small business goals, but the GAO 
clearly viewed the SAP small business reservation as a tool that favored small firms in 
general.  The implication of the GAO decision was to hold that FAR §19.203 market 
research and goal achievement progress factors required for analysis of “which 
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socioeconomic program to use” were inapplicable to SAT level contracts.109  The GAO 
did not mention another possible resolution that would have accommodated agency price 
competition interest and SDVOSBs’ concerns, namely, an SDVOSB set-aside at level 
below SAT. Finally, the GAO chastised the SDVOSB firm for not citing specific legal 
authority for its insistence that SDVOSB set-aside be considered once an SDVOSB firm 
expressed interest in the procurement.  The GAO stopped short of saying no such 
authority existed.  Instead, the GAO endorsed the lack of registration by an interested 
SDVSOB under the solicitation’s NAICS as a valid technicality ground for refusing a 
SDVSOB set-aside despite two or more SDVOSBs’ declared interest in the work.  In 
terms the Cohen-Eimicke framework, this decision suggested that agencies need not 
focus on either SDVOSB Program inputs or outputs below SAT, and that SAP could be 
actually be viewed as a tool for SDVOSB Program avoidance altogether.       
 
The GAO reinstated the SDVOSB set-aside consideration obligation at the level above 
SAT in its June 25, 2012 decision Split Rock-Costs
110
 since the SBA added this 
obligation in its amended regulations.  The case arose because the SBA continued 
allowing Federal buyers not to consider SDVOSB set-asides before small business set-
asides, despite the amendments.
111
  The GAO thus realigned its design to be input-
focused, but retained the additional scrutiny for consideration of individual outputs.  
 
The courts began with an inputs-focused approach that favored also output- and outcome-
related considerations related to business development of SDVOSBs.  In the 2007 
Knowledge Connections v. United States litigation, the COFC considered whether buying 
agencies were obligated to shape their acquisition planning in ways that would meet the 3 
percent SDVOSB goal by attracting niche SDVOSB vendors.  That case concerned the 
VETS Government-Wide Acquisition Contract (GWAC), which EO 13360 mandated to 
be “reserved for participation” by (i.e., set aside for,) SDVOSBs.  In the April 3, 2007 
                                                 
109 FAR § 19.203 (2011). 
110 U.S. GOVERNMENT ACCOUNTABILITY OFFICE (GAO), Split Rock, Inc.-Costs, B-404892.2 (2012), 
available at: http://www.gao.gov/products/P00891. 
111 Id. 
 40 
decision, the court deferred to the 2001 FAR Council view that, by itself, the original 3 
percent statutory goal had “no regulatory purpose for agencies” because “only the goal 
negotiated with the SBA [wa]s relevant to that agency.”112  However, the court took the 
position that EO 13360 was legally enforceable, in that it turned the achievement of the 3 
percent statutory goal and the attraction of the ever-greater number of niche and new 
SDVOSB set-aside recipients into mandatory, judicially reviewable criteria.  
 
The court’s pro-business development position was not to last long, however. On 
December 19, 2007,
113
 the court rejected the government’s argument that EO 13360 is a 
non-enforceable internal management order, and held that it was enforceable because it 
was implementing the President’s Small Business Act duty to set agency goals in pursuit 
of the 3 percent government-wide goal.  The COFC also found judicially reviewable 
DOD policies such as the 2007 Krieg Memorandum on the use of the VETS GWAC and 
the DOD-GSA consultations undertaken as part of acquisition planning.  However, the 
court gave buyers wide discretion to structure acquisitions in ways that excluded new or 
niche SDVOSBs in order to reconcile EO 13360 with other policies, such as the Anti-
Bundling Initiative, that favored firms with broader experience because contracts with 
broad requirements that are set aside for small firms are not considered legally bundled 
under the Small Business Act.  Thus, the program process design was to favor greater 
program outputs unless the agency could utilize greater program inputs on lesser number 
of outputs. 
 
In the June 15, 2009 opinion, Totolo/King, JV v. United States, the COFC attempted to 
set standards for something it described as a “meaningful winnowing process to 
determine the availability of eligible, capable veteran-owned small-business contractors” 
under both the VA and the government-wide SDVOSB Programs.
114
  The court held that, 
unlike Veterans First, the government-wide SDVOSB Program does not impose a 
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mandate to restrict competition to SDVOSBs.  However, the court also stated: “The 
general duties and requirements under each respective statute are not mutually 
exclusive.”115  Otherwise, the court mixed Vets First priority standards with FAR small 
business and SDVOSB market research standards, treating them interchangeably at 
various times.  The court acknowledged that, under FAR § 19.202-2 (2011), “[t]he 
contracting officer must, to the extent practicable, encourage maximum participation by 
small business, veteran-owned small business, service-disabled veteran-owned small 
business . . . in acquisitions by taking the following actions: (a) Before issuing 
solicitations, make every reasonable effort to find additional small business concerns. . . 
.”  However, an “ad hoc superficial search” by the contracting officer of a contractors’ 
registration database was deemed to be non-prejudicial on the grounds that registration in 
the database does not equal interest in the procurement. Indeed, no contemporaneous 
evidence of a search was produced.  The court also implicitly questioned whether 
subsection (b) of that regulation, concerning mandatory publicity for solicitations and 
contract actions, requires any specific or customary disclosures of bonding information. 
The court noted that Federal agency buyers have “wide discretion” to make SDVOSB 
set-asides as a matter of the Contracting Officer’s “business judgement,” and further 
appeared to equate set-aside discretion standards with standards for determining 
responsibility.  The court eventually concluded that the “public interest in providing fair 
opportunities” for SDVOSB would not be served by directing the VA to redo its market 
research and Sources Sought Notice because the SDVOSB joint venture was unable to 
prove unreasonableness or arbitrariness of government actions despite proof of 
inconsistent and superficial agency actions and despite irreparable financial harm to the 
SDVOSB joint venture.  From the Cohen-Eimicke model perspective, the court did not 
view the SDVOSB Program as affirmatively benefitting its outputs, increasing program 
inputs, or improving its outcomes, but merely as providing some very minimal process 
obligations and minimal protections. On June 6, 2011, however, the CAFC on appeal 
ordered to dismiss the case as moot because of the death of the qualifying SDV owner.
116
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Three years after Knowledge Connections case, on September 22, 2011, the court again 
allowed an SDVOSB to seek judicial enforcement of EO 13360 mandates in BlueStar 
Energy Services v. United States.
117
  The claims for relief were described as follows:  
In protesting both the GSA and DLA [Defense Logistics Agency] Solicitations as 
improper, the plaintiff alleged that the agencies failed to make any attempts to 
encourage participation by SDVOSBs in contravention of Executive Order 
13,360, Exec. Order No. 13,360, 69 Fed. Reg. 62,549 (Oct. 20, 2004), and 15 
U.S.C. § 644(g)(1), which set minimum goals for participation by small 
businesses in procurement contracts. Additionally, in its protest of the DLA 
Solicitation, plaintiff alleged that the Solicitation was improper in that it required 
all SDVOSBs and SBCs to satisfy the NMR [Non-Manufacturer Rule] [on a 
contract with a service NAICS where such NMR requirement was made a 
condition of participation in an SDVOSB set-aside]. According to plaintiff, these 
improprieties rendered the Solicitations unlawful, necessitating a rebidding.
118
  
Thus, the court in BlueStar appeared to allow for judicial enforcement of some kind of 
duty to align program process with inputs and outputs. However, the court held that the 
EO 13360 claim was moot because of the SDVOSB firms’ loss of status certification or 
qualification, and the NMR claim was moot because of the dissolution of the set-aside.     
 
In the 2012-2014 timeframe, the program management standards for agency buyer 
discretion to conduct SDVOSB set-asides were further muddled in the COFC and CAFC 
Kingdomware opinions.  Although their holdings are outside this study’s scope as they 
concern the VA’s Veterans First SDVOSB Program, dicta in both Kingdomware opinions 
also discussed the Small Business Act’s SDVOSB goals and set-aside authorities.  In the 
Cohen-Eimicke program management sense, dicta in this case raised important questions 
on the future of government-wide and DOD SDBOSB set-asides now that the DOD is 
meeting its 3 percent goal.  At issue in Kingdomware was VA’s refusal to set aside a 
                                                 
117 See BlueStar Energy Services v. United States, 100 Fed.Cl. 607 (2011). 
118 BlueStar Energy Services v. United States, 100 Fed.Cl. 607 (2011). 
 43 
contract for SDVOSBs as VA declined to conduct a Rule of Two analysis or sole source 
analysis for purposes of a SDVOSB set-aside.  Instead, VA chose to proceed with a 
Federal Supply Schedule (FSS, a type of MAC) order award to a non-SDVOSB.   
 
In the November 27, 2012 opinion, the COFC found that the FAR exempted the FSS 
purchases from the government-wide SDVOSB set-aside authority, and that “[a]gency 
discretion to use the FSS is usually unrestricted,” “unfettered,” or “ambiguous” even in 
light of SDVOSB goals.
119
  Notably, the court ruled so two years after enactment of the 
2010 Small Business Jobs Act discretionary set-aside authorities for FSS and other IDVs.  
Further, in the June 3, 2014 opinion, the CAFC stated that, traditionally, “agencies are 
not required to implement small business set-aside programs before or while using the 
FSS,” including the Rule of Two analysis.120  Both COFC and CAFC held that Veterans 
First mandatory set-asides were effective any time before the 3 percent goal floor is met 
but not if it is already exceeded, and that the Federal SDVOSB Program is always 
discretionary.  In particular, CAFC worried that requiring the Rule of Two consideration 
in all procurements will make SDVOSBs too successful and make the 3 percent goal 
“whatever number the Rule of Two produces.”121  Thus, the courts held that an agency 
has discretion to wholly exclude FSS purchases from set-aside if it decides to meet the 
goals in other way, and that convenience of FSS ordering procedures justifies ignoring 
the Rule of Two even if two or more qualified SDVOSBs are present. 
 
The dissent argued that neither Congress nor the FAR consider it “bad policy” to exceed 
SDVOSB goals, that Federal Contracting Officers have an “existing obligation under the 
[FAR} to conduct a Rule of Two analysis in nearly every acquisition exceeding $3,000,” 
and that “the majority opinion would saddle Contracting Officers with the obligation in 
every acquisition to determine the status of the agency’s small business goals – expressed 
as percentages of total awarded contract dollars—but does not elaborate on how 
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individual Contracting Officers can prove and determine that these goals have been 
conclusively ‘met’ before or even after the end of the fiscal year.”122   
 
This study should not be construed to address in any way the litigation merits of the VA 
Kingdomware case, which is now being appealed to the U.S. Supreme Court.
123
  
Moreover, conformance to contract management theory or model is not an element of 
statutory interpretation.  Yet, it may be useful to acknowledge, from the Cohen-Eimicke 
model perspective, that these COFC and CAFC decisions could have significant program 
management implications on the government-wide SDVOSB Program if their reasoning 
were to be extrapolated beyond the VA Veterans First SDVOSB Program.  Specifically, 
any expansions of these decisions would impose an inputs-based cap on the 
Federal/DOD/DON SDVOSB Program, thereby potentially limiting the mandatory 
consideration of SDVOSB set-asides required by COFC in Knowledge Connection per 
EO 13360. They would also introduce additional unguided discretion into the process, 
and sever the set-aside process from assistance to outputs entirely.  They would, likewise, 
curtail the GAO’s SDVOSB Program design scope contemplated in Split Rock.   
 
The result of SDVOSB Program’s years of management by litigation is a stark tension 
between some tribunals’ emphasis on the Program’s policy intent and others’ emphasis 
on minimum compliance duties. Unsurprisingly, no coherent alignment was reached 
between the Program’s inputs, process, outputs, and outcomes.  The GAO and the courts 
appear unsuitable to resolve the systemic, strategic conflicts in the Program’s design.       
 
I. COUNTERVAILING OUTCOMES, CONSIDERATIONS, AND 
PROCESSES FACED BY CONTRACTING OFFICERS EXERCISING SDVOSB 
SET-ASIDE DISCRETION. 
Contracting Officers have the responsibility to use the sensitive discretionary power to 
navigate through the acquisition process for the end result of supporting the mission of 
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the DOD.  Under FAR Parts 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, and 16.5, the highly scrutinized use of 
discretionary power requires the applied effort of Contracting Officers to produce 
justifications supported by in-depth market research and business case analysis.  The 
process of using sole source (direct) and/or competitive set-asides to create opportunities 
for new SDVOSB suppliers by exclusively assigning the power to Contracting Officers is 
leaving the power with the wrong people, because it requires additional specialized 
expertise in business development and risk analysis, imposes expansive market research 
standards, and causes unnecessary dilemmas for Contracting Officers between support 
for SDVOSBs and policies promoting competition, best value, and impartiality.  These 
countervailing considerations are brought into stark contrast with each other by various 
Better Buying Power
124
 memoranda from Under Secretaries of Defense for Acquisition, 
Technology and Logistics (USD AT&L) Ashton Carter and Frank Kendall, which sought 
to bend Contracting Officer discretion towards competition and reducing risks for 
taxpayers.  For SDVOSBs, these issues may also create a cultural conflict between the 
arms’ length posture of Contracting Officers vis-à-vis prospective vendors and the all-
hands, mission-focused, mutually supportive culture encouraged in military units, 
particularly combat units.      
 
By the very nature of the job function, Contracting Officers already have heavy shoulders 
to support the mission of the DOD by performing a balancing act of the a program’s cost, 
schedule, and performance within the cumbersome acquisition process.  An element of 
the current burden lies within the status of the workforce and weakness of the actual 
requirements.  As stated by the Honorable Frank Kendall, USD AT&L:  
Defense acquisition professionals have a special body of knowledge and 
experience that is not easily acquired. . . . This characteristic applies equally to 
professionals in program management, engineering, contracting, test and 
evaluation, and product support, to name our most obvious examples. One should 
no more expect a lay person to make good judgments about something in these 
acquisition fields—be it a program structure, a risk mitigation approach, or the 
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incentive structure of a contract—than one would expect an amateur to tell a 
lawyer how to argue a case, or a brain surgeon how to do an operation, or a 
brigade commander how to organize an attack. No one should expect an amateur 
without acquisition experience to be able to exercise professional judgments in 
acquisition without the years of training and experience it takes to learn the field. 




Working with small businesses, particularly SDVOSBs, requires additional skills to 
assess business capabilities, veterans’ professional experience, and to balance risks of 
going with new firms against rewards of business development.  Those skills are 
practiced by the SBA Business Development Specialists, but are not widely taught to 
DOD Contracting Officers. Contracting Officers are also the sole authorized entity to 
conduct business with industry regarding Government requirements.  Also noted by 
Under Secretary Kendall, “Requirements development . . . has been identified as a 
weakness in the department and has led to cost and schedule overruns on many programs. 
. . . Requirements development is paramount to successful acquisition outcomes.”126 
Unclear requirements lead to Contracting Officers functioning on a compressed timeline 
in regards to procurement acquisition lead time (PALT) and the impact is shorter time 
frames for market research.  In a fiscally time sensitive environment, Contracting 
Officers are pressed with tight award deadlines and often the tools of sources sought, 
industry days, and the other tools to identify small businesses and socio economical small 
businesses are cut short to allow for the contract award according to the program 
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3, 2011), available at: http://fcw.com/articles/2011/01/03/dod-acquisition-reform-for-training-and-
requirements.aspx.   
 47 
schedule.  The reality is that Contracting Officers are the only ones that can procure the 
goods and services to support the mission.  If the requirement holder does not plan, there 
is Government program delay, or funding is an issue, the mission must still be supported, 
even if diminished market research to identify SDVOSBs is the collateral damage.    
 
Direct awards to newly established SDVOSB cause Contracting Officers to experience a 
dilemma in obtaining healthy competition within the acquisition process.  In a recent 
memorandum, the Honorable Frank Kendall reminds the acquisition workforce about the 
importance of competition: “Competition is the most valuable means we have to motivate 
industry to deliver effective and efficient solutions for the Department of Defense (DoD). 
When we create and maintain a competitive environment, we are able to spur innovation, 
improve quality and performance, and lower costs for the supplies and services we 
acquire. Over the past four years, the Department has not met its competition goals. In 
fact, we have experienced a declining competition rate, and we must take action to 
reverse this trend.”127  Then again, in the 2014 Guidelines for Creating and Maintaining 
a Competitive Environment for Supplies and Services in the Department of Defense, the 
acquisition workforce is simply reminded why competition is important: “[B]ecause it 
works. Competition, direct or indirect, is the most effective motivator for industry to 
reduce costs and improve performance. The Competition in Contracting Act (CICA) was 
enacted in 1984 to promote competition and thus reduce costs and improve performance. 
CICA established full and open competition as the standard for most procurement actions 
while at the same time allowing for a number of exceptions, some of which require that 
agencies request offers from as many potential sources as is practicable under the 
circumstances. For example, one noteworthy exception is giving priority to small 
business set asides (see Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR) 19.201(a), 19.202-1, and 
19.203(e)).”128  Small business set asides are an effective competitive tool to stimulate 
                                                 
127 Frank Kendall, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology and Logistics (USD AT&L), 
Memorandum, Actions to Improve Department of Defense Competition (April 21, 2014), available at: 
http://bbp.dau.mil/docs/USA004313-14.pdf.  
128 OFFICE OF THE UNDERSECRETARY OF DEFENSE FOR ACQUISITION, TECHNOLOGY, AND LOGISTICS (USD 
AT&L), Guidelines for Creating and Maintaining a Competitive Environment for Supplies and Services in 
the Department of Defense (Aug. 2014), available at: http://bbp.dau.mil/docs/BBP%202-
0%20Competition%20Guidelines%20(Published%2022%20Aug%202014).pdf.  
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small business.  The current process of utilizing the Contracting Officers ability to direct 
awards to existing or newly established SDVOSB’s to meet a three percent goal creates 
an unnecessary dilemma when competition with small businesses of all types is a 
possibility and no standards are given when to pick SDVOSBs over other small firms.   
 
Further, Contracting Officers must be impartial and fair in regards to interactions with 
industry, especially during the solicitation process.  Contracting Officers must at all cost 
protect the integrity of the acquisition and be equally responsive to all potential bidders, 
small and large alike.  FAR § 1.602-2, Responsibilities of Contracting Officers, provides: 
Contracting officers are responsible for ensuring performance of all necessary 
actions for effective contracting, ensuring compliance with the terms of the 
contract, and safeguarding the interests of the United States in its contractual 
relationships. In order to perform these responsibilities, Contracting Officers 
should be allowed wide latitude to exercise business judgment. Contracting 
Officers shall -- (a) Ensure that the requirements of [FAR §] 1.602-1(b) have 
been met, and that sufficient funds are available for obligation; (b) Ensure that 




Newly established SDVOSBs may lack the understanding and business development to 
properly respond to the solicitation.  Should Contracting Officers choose to “hand hold” 
potential contractors, this may causes an appearance of unfair advantage and raise 
questions as to the integrity of the acquisition.  Engaging in supportive assistance to the 
SDVOSBs places Contracting Officers close to potential violation of FAR § 3.104-3 and 
-4, which prohibit disclosure of source selection information:  
(a) Prohibition on disclosing procurement information (41 U.S.C. § 2102).  (1) A 
person described in paragraph (a)(2) of this subsection must not, other than as 
provided by law, knowingly disclose contractor bid or proposal information or 
source selection information before the award of a Federal agency procurement 
contract to which the information relates… Disclosure, Protection, and Marking 
                                                 
129 FAR § 1.602-2 (2014). 
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of Contractor Bid or Proposal Information and Source Selection Information. (a) 
Except as specifically provided for in this subsection, no person or other entity 
may disclose contractor bid or proposal information or source selection 
information to any person other than a person authorized, in accordance with 
applicable agency regulations or procedures, by agency head or the contracting 
officer to receive such information. . . .
130
   
 
SDVOSBs without a proper business development process and support are at risk of not 
being technically acceptable due to lack of knowledge about the level of detail needed in 
bid, proposal, or quotation submissions, while Contracting Officers may be powerless to 
help.   
 
Lastly, when market research, FAR Part 10, supports a SDVOSB direct award, two of the 
five elements of FAR § 19.1406, Sole Source Awards to Service-disabled Veteran-owned 
Small Business Concerns, are notable as dilemmas for Contracting Officers.  FAR § 
19.1406(a)(3), states that direct award to an SDVOSB cannot be for an 8(a) exclusive 
requirement, while FAR § 19.1406(a)(4) states that the SDVOSB have to be determined 
responsible: 
(a) A contracting officer shall consider a contract award to a SDVOSB concern 
on a sole source basis (see 6.302-5(b)(6)), before considering small business set-
asides (see 19.203 and Subpart 19.5) provided none of the exclusions of 19.1404 
apply and--(3) The requirement is not currently being performed by an 8(a) 
participant under the provisions of Subpart 19.8 or has been accepted as a 
requirement by SBA under Subpart 19.8; (4) The service-disabled veteran-owned 
small business concern has been determined to be a responsible contractor with 




                                                 
130 FAR § 3.104-3 and -4 (2014). 
131 FAR § 19.1406 (2014). 
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Further, Contracting Officers’ discretion is conflicted between the newly established or 
existing SDVOSBs and the non-SDVOSB 8(a) Program Small Disadvantaged Businesses 
(SDBs).  If there is a single 8(a) participant contractor that does not already exclusively 
hold the particular requirement, but is capable of fulfilling said requirement, and there is 
a newly established SDVOSB that is also capable of fulfilling the requirement, a 
Contracting Officer knows that the 8(a) contractor has been through a robust business 
development program on the front end.  The newly established SDVOSB has the 
regulatory support of FAR Part 19.6, Certificates of Competency (COC) and 
Determinations of Responsibility, but only on the back end, once it is found non-
responsible by the Contracting Officer:   
Subpart 19.601 – General (Certificates of Competency and Determinations of 
Responsibility) (a) A Certificate of Competency (COC) is the certificate issued by 
the Small Business Administration (SBA) stating that the holder is responsible 
(with respect to all elements of responsibility, including, but not limited to, 
capability, competency, capacity, credit, integrity, perseverance, tenacity, and 
limitations on subcontracting) for the purpose of receiving and performing a 
specific Government contract…(b) The COC program empowers the Small 
Business Administration (SBA) to certify to Government Contracting Officers as 
to all elements of responsibility of any small business concern to receive and 
perform a specific Government contract. The COC program does not extend to 
questions concerning regulatory requirements imposed and enforced by other 
Federal agencies…(c) The COC program is applicable to all Government 
acquisitions. A contracting officer shall, upon determining an apparent successful 
small business offeror to be nonresponsible, refer that small business to the SBA 
for a possible COC, even if the next acceptable offer is also from a small 
business.…132 
 
With or without the COC, Contracting Officers still have to make determinations of 
responsibility per FAR subpart 9.1 that the contractor “has adequate financial resources, a 
                                                 
132 FAR § 19.601 (2014). 
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satisfactory performance record, can comply with the standards for support services, 
possesses a satisfactory record of integrity and business ethics, and has the necessary 
organization, experience, accounting, and technical skills to perform this requirement.”133  
In a mission-focused reality, Contracting Officers are pulled between contractors that 
have been in a business development program, i.e. the 8(a) Program, and set-aside awards 
to established and/or newly established SDVOSBs.     
 
The current process of the SDVOSB Program is singularly focused on discretion 
authority of the DOD Contracting Officer, thereby placing the responsibility for Program 
outcomes with the wrong people.  Ideally, Contracting Officers need an SDVOSB 
business development program providing assurance that the SDVOSB firms are deemed 
responsible and capable in advance, beyond a COC.  Neither the PTAC system, nor the 
SBA’s Small Business Development Centers, nor the VA’s Vocational Rehabilitation 




Contracting Officers have neither the sufficient strategic perspective not the business 
development skills to ensure SDVOSBs at large are growing through an increasing 
volume of DOD contract awards.  In the acquisition workforce, the role of Contracting 
Officers as business development funders and counselors would be too preoccupied and 
conflicted, such that the current process could likely be causing a disservice leading to 
disillusionment of those SDVs that seek DOD work.   
                                                 
133 FAR Subpart 9.1 (2014). 
134 The U.S. DEPARTMENT OF VETERANS AFFAIRS (VA) M28R VOCATIONAL REHABILITATION AND 
EMPLOYMENT SERVICE MANUAL, Part IV, Section C, Chapters 8 and 9 (Rev. March 2014), make it appear 
that participation in competitive procurements, even competitive set-asides, is an undesirable factor for 
SDVs seeking VA-approved self-employment plans; on the contrary, commitment from buying agencies 
for sole source awards would appear advantageous for SDVs seeking such plans.  This creates a conundrum 
for SDVOSBs seeking a break or pathway into the Federal contracting market.         
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V. UNDERSTANDING THE SDVOSB PROGRAM OPERATIONS 
THROUGH THE COHEN-EIMICKE CONTRACT MANAGEMENT 
PERFORMANCE MODEL.  
A. SDVOSB PROGRAM TAXONOMY: INPUTS – OVERALL TRENDS ON 
DOD AND DON SPENDING WITH SDVOSBS.  
To understand the business development value or sustainment value of the SDVOSB 
Program, in the broader context of opportunity for SDVOSBs, it is important to 
examine not only the goaling data, but also the net and the new spending received 
by SDVOSB firms.  Data below illustrates DOD and DON contract spending trends on 
SDVOSBs.  In this paper, all references to “New Awards” or “Awards” are 
interchangeable. For purposes of SDVOSB Program, its legal and management 
authorities concern New Awards, not contract modifications.  Therefore, for purposes of 
evaluating the design and performance of the SDVOSB Program, primary focus will be 
on New Awards.  New Awards can be thought of as the sustainment value of the 
SDVOSB Program. 
 
The Goaling Report spending data is FPDS-NG data reported in FPDS annual 
government-wide small business goaling reports;
135
 this data contains new awards and 
accretive modifications such as options.
136
  Certain actions have been excluded from this 
data because of place of award or performance and other goaling exclusions.
137
  This is 
the data on which DOD and DON are rated for goaling compliance.  Specifically, goaling 
reports omit deductive modifications, such as deductive changes, cancellations, or 
terminations. Therefore, goaling reports data typically exceed the net business 
development value of Federal contract spending, but usually not by much.  
                                                 
135 U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (GSA), FEDERAL PROCUREMENT DATA SYSTEM-NEXT 
GENERATION (FPDS-NG) (2015), available at: https://www.fpds.gov.   
136 See U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (SBA), Goaling Guidelines for Small Business Preference 
Programs (2003), available at: https://www.sba.gov/sites/default/files/goals_goaling_guidelines.pdf. 
137 See Max V. Kidalov and Keith F. Snider, Once More, with Feeling: Federal Small Business Contracting 
Policy in the Obama Administration, 22 PUB. PROC. L. REV. 1 (2013). 
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The New Awards data shows the value of all DOD SDVOSB contract actions identified 
“Modification 0”; this is the value of opportunity theoretically open to SDVOSBs new to 
defense contracting.  The Net Total Spending data shows the net sum of all SDVOSB 
contract spending regardless of goaling exclusions and including modifications with 
additive or deductive changes, cancellations, or terminations.  This is the business 
development value of the Program for SDVOSBs.   Again, the Small Business Act 
describes the SDVOSB Program in terms of set-aside authority for what must be New 
Awards, while the Small Business Act also describes SDVOSB goals in terms of the total 
value of agency contracts that includes New Awards as well as Accretive 
Modifications.
138
  In general, all references to the SDVOSB Program below mean the 
combined SDVOSB sole source and competitive set-asides, whether in Open Market or 
under IDVs; on some occasions, references will be made to the SDVOSB Program within 
the meaning of FAR Part 19 Open Market authorities. 
1. DOD and DON SDVOSB Spending Trends. 
From the program management perspective, it is critical to examine whether the 
SDVOSB Program operates to its avowed justification as a tool to help DOD and DON in 
meeting the 3 percent statutory spending goal.  Data in two Figures and two Tables below 
shows trends in DOD and DON SDVOSB spending, including New Awards, Accretive 
Modifications such as options or changes, and SDVOSB Program set-asides.  Accretive 
Modifications are represented in the two Figures by the difference between New Awards 
and Net Total Spending (or Goaling Spending).   
 
DOD SDVOSB Net Total Spending and Goaling Spending have been growing every year 
except for FY2013. The most striking trend, however, is the significant growth of 
Accretive Modifications spending in relation to New Awards.  The volume of set-aside 
awards dollars has essentially stalled over the last 5 fiscal years; the volume of New 
Awards spending in FY2014 is less than 4 years ago. In FY2014, Accretive 
Modifications reached a record of approximately $3 billion in SDVOSB spending, or 
approximately 42 percent of Goaling Report Spending and 40 percent in Net Total 
                                                 
138 Compare 15 U.S.C. §§ 644 with 657(f) (2014). 
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SDVOSB Spending.  On the other hand, data also shows that revenue losses experienced 
by some SDVOSBs on DOD contracts have also grown.  The volume of such losses has 
grown twenty-three (23) times since Fiscal Year 2004, though it is but one percent of 
SDVOSB spending.   
 
DON SDVOSB Net Total Spending and Goaling Spending indicators have been growing 
every year except for FY2012-2013.  SDVOSB set-aside New Awards spending in 
FY2014 stands below that of FY2011.  And, again, the Net Spending and Goaling 
Spending are increased primarily with Accretive Modifications.  In FY2014, such 
modifications represent approximately 50 percent of Goaling Report Spending and 
approximately 53 percent of Net Total SDVOSB Spending.  With regard to Net Losses, it 
appears that SDVOSB firms in the DON market have experienced greater volume of 
losses in FY2013 due to sequestration than in the DOD market overall.  
 




Table 1. DOD SDVOSB Spending Through SDVOSB Program and Non-Program 
Contracting. 
 
















FY 05 $1,052,478,593.16 $761,878,459.16 $1,106,784,586.32 -$2,889,355.00 $5,235,662.21
FY 06 $1,554,272,140.92 $1,004,843,765.25 $1,585,568,137.60 -$6,656,892.22 $127,864,822.10
FY 07 $1,993,588,680.08 $1,314,191,156.39 $1,860,328,366.19 -$13,231,188.94 $188,551,350.19
FY 08 $3,250,731,728.83 $2,155,293,725.19 $3,114,178,647.93 -$5,226,331.58 $626,375,475.21
FY 09 $4,278,496,405.19 $2,672,712,772.53 $4,325,412,040.62 -$6,323,325.78 $807,676,507.98
FY 10 $4,952,672,557.40 $3,249,104,512.90 $5,303,035,295.34 -$23,936,954.42 $1,108,479,164.06
FY 11 $5,516,220,623.87 $3,588,515,457.17 $5,843,937,110.51 -$28,536,034.45 $1,118,807,288.17
FY 12 $6,095,690,311.19 $4,039,320,447.66 $6,407,309,374.24 -$21,546,854.01 $1,016,670,339.99
FY 13 $6,036,362,912.94 $3,631,900,147.23 $6,049,070,516.98 -$45,842,951.70 $970,494,193.20
FY 14 $6,977,239,135.52 $4,165,210,148.79 $7,015,585,365.61 -$59,479,586.18 $1,111,110,741.55
DOD SDVOSB Spending 
Through SDVOSB Program and Non-Program Contracting
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Table 2. DON SDVOSB Spending Through SDVOSB Program and Non-Program 
Contracting. 
Findings: DOD and DON Contracting Officers appear to be giving up on using the 
SDVOSB Program set-aside awards as means to increase SDVOSB spending inputs 
(either in terms of Goaling Report spending or other types of spending).  Indeed, 
DON Contracting Officers have been reducing all New Awards SDVOSB spending.  
This trend began in FY2011, the first full year when DOD stopped issuing its 
SDVOSB Strategic Plan.  For meeting statutory goals, DOD and DON have come to 
increasingly rely on accretive modifications (including options and changes).  Those 
modification funds are going to SDVOSBs already holding contract awards. 
Accretive Modifications are taken into account for goal-achievement purposes; but 
for these modifications, DOD would have been unable to finally make its 3 percent 
goal in FY2014.  It appears that Contracting Officers are finding mechanisms other 
than the SDVOSB Program set-aside awards to meet the SDVOSB goal.  Despite 
recent growth in Net Revenue Losses, it also appears that most SDVOSB spending 
goes to firms that have the capacity to succeed in DOD/DON contracting markets 
without much or any SDVOSB-focused assistance.  That said, the growth in Net 
Losses suggests there may be contract administration problems or SDVOSB 















FY 05 $226,015,573.95 $173,876,981.48 $170,906,769.61 -$16,564,489.00 $480,126.21
FY 06 $280,739,892.20 $177,599,959.36 $216,915,659.14 -$14,859,441.62 $5,593,236.41
FY 07 $396,190,742.56 $263,270,094.01 $391,340,524.43 -$14,009,392.88 $15,845,626.68
FY 08 $691,186,314.12 $442,357,229.47 $671,530,170.74 -$12,215,934.24 $89,096,003.05
FY 09 $788,989,659.18 $461,951,179.24 $796,337,568.37 -$14,780,257.46 $149,555,398.54
FY 10 $1,142,476,957.42 $676,029,864.27 $1,179,774,621.25 -$23,885,252.36 $199,401,453.66
FY 11 $1,490,203,571.27 $968,919,292.09 $1,448,369,388.46 -$51,325,908.55 $228,912,449.95
FY 12 $1,455,244,518.39 $874,889,959.46 $1,407,329,740.60 -$56,525,605.81 $150,529,438.65
FY 13 $1,399,174,253.81 $774,329,918.96 $1,396,030,002.74 -$61,654,549.74 $202,161,239.86
FY 14 $1,569,204,210.59 $848,366,113.62 $1,768,749,049.22 -$48,437,426.31 $205,609,669.30
DON SDVOSB Spending Through SDVOSB Program and Non-Program Contracting
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2. DOD and DON SDVOSB Spending Realignment from Open Market 
to IDVs. 
Data in two Figures and two Tables below compare DOD and DON New Awards 
spending with SDVOSBs on the Open Market against such spending through task or 
delivery orders under the Indefinite Delivery Vehicles (abbreviated in FPDS as IDVs, 
and also known as Multiple-Award Contracts (MACs) or Indefinite-Delivery, Indefinite-
Quantity (IDIQ) Contracts).  Data shows that both DOD and DON SDVOSB spending 
have undergone significant realignment in favor of IDV spending, whether inside or 
outside the SDVOSB Program.  The realignment is particularly stark at DON, where 
recent IDV spending has been on the rise while Open Market spending has been sharply 
dropping.  At DOD, both IDV and Open Market spending have declined since FY2012, 
but Open Market spending took a sharper dive. Because IDVs typically require years of 
experience and breadth of capabilities, this realignment appears to favor more established 
firms over new or niche firms.   
 
Further, SDVOSB Program New Awards spending, both as Open Market set-asides and 
as IDV set-asides, decreased since FY2010 and F20Y11, respectively.  The same trend 
held at DON and DOD. 
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Figure 3. DOD SDVOSB New Awards Spending Realignment Among Contracting 
Mechanisms. 
 











FY 05 $377,972,604.42 $1,137,854.21 $383,905,854.74 $4,097,808.00
FY 06 $477,984,555.60 $91,626,297.10 $526,859,209.65 $36,238,525.00
FY 07 $532,176,914.58 $107,609,531.69 $782,014,241.81 $80,941,818.50
FY 08 $1,034,338,361.61 $352,576,344.72 $1,120,955,363.58 $273,799,130.49
FY 09 $1,100,735,272.58 $331,297,487.21 $1,571,977,499.95 $476,379,020.77
FY 10 $1,275,678,762.08 $385,524,204.66 $1,973,425,750.82 $722,954,959.40
FY 11 $1,397,633,436.29 $379,678,544.27 $2,190,882,020.88 $739,128,743.90
FY 12 $1,602,058,307.72 $329,421,049.09 $2,437,262,139.94 $683,657,637.83
FY 13 $1,334,049,605.49 $357,859,855.76 $2,297,850,541.74 $612,634,337.44
FY 14 $1,039,536,612.50 $219,856,203.41 $2,189,355,646.12 $615,352,445.24




Figure 4. DON SDVOSB New Award Spending Realignment Among Contracting 
Mechanisms. 
 
Table 4. DON SDVOSB New Awards Spending Realignment Among Contracting 
Mechanisms. 
Findings:  Over the years, DOD and DON SDVOSB New Awards spending trends 
have undergone significant realignments decidedly in favor of IDVs and against 









FY 05 $67,302,506.46 $480,126.21 $106,574,475.02 $0.00
FY 06 $62,902,948.37 $5,484,560.41 $114,697,010.99 $108,676.00
FY 07 $107,012,741.88 $5,781,922.16 $156,257,352.13 $10,063,704.52
FY 08 $191,959,402.66 $42,766,818.10 $250,397,826.81 $46,329,184.95
FY 09 $135,129,897.16 $23,473,954.84 $326,821,282.08 $126,081,443.70
FY 10 $258,164,606.03 $45,527,873.46 $417,865,258.24 $153,873,580.20
FY 11 $418,633,980.37 $26,466,190.98 $550,285,311.72 $202,446,258.97
FY 12 $274,942,000.46 $12,474,068.52 $599,947,959.00 $138,055,370.13
FY 13 $248,846,002.75 $30,301,341.17 $525,483,916.21 $171,859,898.69
FY 14 $193,485,392.75 $19,877,858.33 $654,880,720.87 $185,731,810.97
DON SDVOSB New Award Spending Realignment Among Contracting Mechanisms
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While these trends are a positive testament to capabilities of current SDVOSB 
contractors, such spending trends may depress the business development aspects of 
the SDVOSB Program in particular by using channeling even more set-aside 
spending to already successful SDVOSB firms.  These trends appear to validate the 
criticism of the Program on entrenchment grounds, unless increased participation 
and business development in the Open Market could be otherwise demonstrated.  
These trends coincide with policy and decisional pronouncements, such as the 
December 2007 Knowledge Connections II decision addressing the VETS GWAC 
acquisition strategy and the 2011-2012 Interagency Task Force Reports, which 
favored input-based design and established firms.   
 
3. DOD and DON SDVOSB Program Spending Trends. 
From the program management perspective, it is important to examine general SDVOSB 
Program spending trends as well as to examine which parts of the SDVOSB Program 
process generate greatest contributions to program inputs.  Data in two Figures and two 
Tables below examines the composite elements of SDVOSB Program New Awards 
spending at DOD and DON.  Trends in this data suggest that competitive non-SAP 
SDVOSB set-asides are the largest driver of SDVOSB Program New Awards spending at 
both DOD and DON.  On the other hand, SDVOSB sole sources have peaked in FY2008 
and are presently in such decline that they make only a marginal contribution.     
From FY2011 on, the absolute levels and the direction of SDVOSB set-aside New 
Awards spending at both DOD and DON has been declining or stagnant (except DOD 
FY2014).  Further, DON’s sharp drop in SDVOSB Program New Awards spending in 
FY2012 and the subsequent spending plateau appears to have depressed this spending 
category DOD-wide.  DOD enjoys a surge in all SAP SDVOSB set-asides spending 
which overtook all SDVSOB sole source set-asides spending.   
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Figure 5. DOD SDVOSB Program (Set-Asides) New Awards Spending. 
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Table 5. DOD SDVOSB Program (Set-Asides) New Awards Spending. 
 










All SAP SDVOSB 
Set-Asides





FY 05 $11,143.00 $5,224,519.21 $5,235,662.21 $2,943,401.21 $0.00 $2,943,401.21
FY 06 $16,718,813.00 $111,146,009.10 $127,864,822.10 $4,242,398.00 $0.00 $4,242,398.00
FY 07 $30,797,418.88 $157,753,931.31 $188,551,350.19 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
FY 08 $62,002,225.78 $564,373,249.43 $626,375,475.21 $442,960.00 $0.00 $442,960.00
FY 09 $54,970,337.86 $752,706,170.12 $807,676,507.98 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
FY 10 $29,563,592.75 $1,078,915,571.31 $1,108,479,164.06 $44,907,498.19 $3,980,217.40 $40,927,280.79
FY 11 $27,370,260.15 $1,091,437,028.02 $1,118,807,288.17 $60,530,394.19 $3,425,625.10 $57,104,769.09
FY 12 $33,188,898.78 $983,481,441.21 $1,016,670,339.99 $42,137,961.88 $2,972,800.48 $39,165,161.40
FY 13 $30,870,226.70 $939,623,966.50 $970,494,193.20 $100,148,889.91 $3,439,389.69 $96,709,500.22
FY 14 $43,091,617.15 $1,068,019,124.40 $1,111,110,741.55 $107,033,001.10 $14,890,211.05 $92,142,790.05




Table 6. DON SDVOSB Program (Set-Asides) New Awards Spending. 
Findings: Neither DOD nor DON are growing the spending volume of SDVOSB 
Program New Awards, though there may be modest attempts at reversal of this 
trend.  Thus far, such spending at DOD and DON is below the FY2011 levels.  
Because competitive set-asides are the predominant driver of this spending, there 
appears to be a growing lack of interest in putting funds and requirements towards 
SDVOSB set-aside competitions. Both DOD and DON are experiencing long-term 
drop in SDVOSB sole source New Awards spending. SAP SDVOSB set-aside 
spending at DOD and DON is trending in the same growth direction, but DOD’s 
growth is much stronger relative to DON’s, as well as to other DOD spending such 
as SDVOSB sole source set-asides.  This suggests that DON Contracting Officers 
may be more risk-averse and more reluctant to commit funds through the SAP 
discretionary SDVOSB set-aside authority than Contracting Officers across DOD at 
large.   
B. SDVOSB PROGRAM TAXONOMY: PROCESS – TRENDS ON 
CONTRACTING OFFICERS’ DISCRETION TO USE SDVOSB SET ASIDES 
AND OTHER CONTRACTING MECHANISMS. 
To understand whether DOD and DON buyers have used their discretion to target work 
specifically to SDVOSBs, it is necessary to examine SDVOSB contracting action trends.  









All SAP SDVOSB Set-
Asides





FY 05 $0.00 $480,126.21 $480,126.21 $274,707.21 $0.00 $274,707.21
FY 06 $829,536.00 $4,763,700.41 $5,593,236.41 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
FY 07 $5,438,650.16 $10,406,976.52 $15,845,626.68 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
FY 08 $16,800,432.05 $72,295,571.00 $89,096,003.05 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
FY 09 $15,060,451.85 $134,494,946.69 $149,555,398.54 $0.00 $0.00 $0.00
FY 10 $15,412,014.58 $183,989,439.08 $199,401,453.66 $7,215,709.44 $2,019,564.95 $5,196,144.49
FY 11 $11,990,664.23 $216,921,785.72 $228,912,449.95 $6,746,265.14 $1,390,131.97 $5,356,133.17
FY 12 $12,590,951.63 $137,938,487.02 $150,529,438.65 $5,651,443.11 $750,310.67 $4,901,132.44
FY 13 $10,019,820.59 $192,141,419.27 $202,161,239.86 $4,353,394.03 $1,371,284.47 $2,982,109.56
FY 14 $14,411,041.65 $191,198,627.65 $205,609,669.30 $12,056,809.65 $4,979,012.02 $7,077,797.63
DON SDVOSB Program (Set-Asides) 
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set-aside tools, which EO 13360 and 2005-2009 DOD Strategic Plans directed to increase 
as a share of other SDVOSB spending and participation measures.     
1. DOD and DON Contracting Actions with SDVOSBs. 
Data in two Figures below shows that the number of DOD New Awards overall remains 
declining or stagnant (taking into account the FY2014 level), while the number of DON 
New Awards have decreased over the last two years to the level below FY2011.  The 
number of DOD and DON Accretive Modifications steadily increases.  This indicates 
greater propensity to fund pre-existing contract awardees.  Data below also shows that 
SDVOSB set-asides of both types are not particularly popular tools for SDVOSB 
contracting at either DOD or DON.  
 
Figure 7. DOD Contracting Actions: Spending Tools for SDVOSB Contracting. 
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Figure 8. DON Contracting Actions: Spending Tools for SDVOSB Contracting. 
Findings:  Instead of giving SDVOSBs New Awards, DOD and DON Contracting 
Officers prefer to give those firms Accretive Modifications, such as options and 
change orders.  By itself, this trend is not necessarily negative; it could simply mean 
that SDVOSBs are now getting better at making multi-year option proposals or 
expanding their performance capacity once projects get under way.  However, there 
is also another trend: DOD and DON Contracting Officers appear to roundly 
disfavor the making of SDVOSB Program set-aside awards despite legislative and 
regulatory grants of discretion, and despite the GAO and EO 13360 mandates that 
such discretion be exercised.  This trend is more pronounced at DON, as is the drop 
in New Awards.  Together, these two trends suggest that Contracting Officers drift 
to other contract mechanisms which may not be as tailored to SDVOSB business 
development, but which are much easier or less risker to undertake.  
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2. DOD and DON SDVOSB Sole Source Set-Aside Awards and Their 
Impact.  
Data in two Tables below illustrates DOD and DON utilization of SDVOSB sole source 
set-asides.  This data includes IDV as well as Open Market awards. Such awards quickly 
increased within the first 4 years of the Program (at DOD) or 3 years (at DON).  Further, 
at DOD, the number of SDVOSB sole source awards is now less than half of what it was 
in FY2008; at DON, this number is below the FY2007-FY2011 levels.  Since FY2009, 
SDVOSB sole sources have accounted for less than 2 percent of DOD SDVOSB New 
Awards; the same is the case at DON since FY2011. Since FY2009, DON has lead DOD 
in terms of SDVOSB set-aside sole source share of total agency New Awards, but the 
lead has been at the level of percentile fractions. 
       
DOD and DON New Awards spending on sole source SDVOSB set-asides has made a 
drop in FY2009 from its peak in FY2008, and has not recovered as of FY2014.  
SDVOSB participation in new SDVOSB sole source set-asides at DOD has been 
declining every year since FY2008, and is now at the level below FY2007-FY2012 
levels. At DON, participation peak was in FY2010, and the present participation is below 




Table 7. DOD New SDVOSB Sole Source Set-Aside Award Trends; Impact on 
Market Entry and SDVOSB Spending. 
 
Table 8. DON New SDVOSB Sole Source Set-Aside Award Trends; Impact on 
Market Entry and SDVOSB Spending. 
Findings:  Over the years, DOD and DON Contracting Officers appeared to 
increasingly disfavor SDVOSB set-aside awards.  As a result, those set-asides’ 





























FY 05 1 0.02% 1 0.07% $11,143.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
FY 06 44 0.91% 44 2.77% $16,718,813.00 1.66% 1.08% 1.05%
FY 07 163 3.06% 126 7.40% $30,797,418.88 2.34% 1.54% 1.66%
FY 08 196 2.51% 158 7.03% $62,002,225.78 2.88% 1.91% 1.99%
FY 09 162 1.88% 138 5.57% $54,970,337.86 2.06% 1.28% 1.27%
FY 10 135 1.43% 115 4.18% $29,563,592.75 0.91% 0.60% 0.56%
FY 11 104 1.12% 88 3.21% $27,370,260.15 0.76% 0.50% 0.47%
FY 12 104 1.12% 89 3.38% $33,188,898.78 0.82% 0.54% 0.52%
FY 13 87 1.01% 81 3.59% $30,870,226.70 0.85% 0.51% 0.51%
FY 14 94 1.03% 79 3.22% $43,091,617.15 1.03% 0.62% 0.61%




















Share of New 
SDVOSB Awards 
Spending







FY 05 0 0.00% 0 0.00% $0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
FY 06 5 0.53% 5 1.10% $829,536.00 0.47% 0.30% 0.38%
FY 07 43 3.31% 33 5.94% $5,438,650.16 2.07% 1.37% 1.39%
FY 08 39 2.27% 31 4.73% $16,800,432.05 3.80% 2.43% 2.50%
FY 09 46 2.33% 41 5.31% $15,060,451.85 3.26% 1.91% 1.89%
FY 10 47 2.22% 36 4.19% $15,412,014.58 2.28% 1.35% 1.31%
FY 11 31 1.40% 25 2.68% $11,990,664.23 1.24% 0.80% 0.83%
FY 12 29 1.24% 23 2.39% $12,590,951.63 1.44% 0.87% 0.89%
FY 13 27 1.24% 24 2.92% $10,019,820.59 1.29% 0.72% 0.72%
FY 14 32 1.48% 30 3.16% $14,411,041.65 1.70% 0.92% 0.81%
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participation is marginal at best.  The DOD Strategic Plans’ alignment of SDVOSB 
sole source set-aside awards to contracting-opportunity objectives of EO 13360 
appears to have been abandoned or severed in practice.  This is not at all surprising 
in light of the lack of standards for Contracting Officer’s discretion to make 
SDVOSN sole source awards as well as the pressures from countervailing FAR and 
DOD Better Buying Power policies emphasizing competition and contractor 
responsibility.  But, without aggressively expanding the FY2014 increase in 
SDVOSB sole source awards, this set-aside authority risks becoming illusory.  Thus, 
disabled veterans who pursue DOD/DON contracting in reliance on being informed 
about this set-aside authority may be at increasing risk of becoming disillusioned 
with the SDVOSB Program because of this authority’s actual non-use.        
 
3. DOD and DON SDVOSB Competitive Set-Aside Awards and Their 
Impact. 
Data in two Tables below illustrates DOD and DON utilization of SDVOSB competitive 
set-asides.  This data includes IDV as well as Open Market awards.  New competitive 
set-aside awards have peaked in FY2010 both at DOD and DON.  Such awards have been 
declining for three years since FY2010, but, at DOD, they have experienced a reversal in 
FY2013 and major growth in FY2014.    
 
SDVOSB competitive set-aside’s contribution to agency SDVOSB spending is generally 
higher at DOD than DON, though the New Awards spending share is comparable. 
SDVOSB competitive set-asides account for about a 50 percent higher share of 
contributions to DOD Goaling spending than to DON Goaling spending.  In terms of 
participation, competitive set-asides account for almost twice the share of New Award 
recipients at DOD than at DON. 
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Table 9. DOD New SDVOSB Competitive Set-Aside Award Trends; Impact on 
Market Entry and SDVOSB Spending. 
 
Table 10. DON New SDVOSB Competitive Set-Aside Award Trends; Impact on 
Market Entry and SDVOSB Spending. 
Findings:  DOD and DON Contracting Officers favor SDVOSB competitive set-
aside awards much more than they do the sole source set-asides.  As a result, the 































Share of Goaling 
Report Spending
FY 05 9 0.20% 9 0.62% $5,224,519.21 0.69% 0.50% 0.47%
FY 06 114 2.36% 123 7.75% $111,146,009.10 11.06% 7.15% 7.01%
FY 07 555 10.43% 404 23.74% $157,753,931.31 12.00% 7.91% 8.48%
FY 08 1165 14.90% 666 29.63% $564,373,249.43 26.19% 17.36% 18.12%
FY 09 1205 14.01% 712 28.76% $752,706,170.12 28.16% 17.59% 17.40%
FY 10 1400 14.87% 763 27.72% $1,078,915,571.31 33.21% 21.78% 20.35%
FY 11 1316 14.16% 728 26.59% $1,091,437,028.02 30.41% 19.79% 18.68%
FY 12 1359 14.63% 700 26.60% $983,481,441.21 24.35% 16.13% 15.35%
FY 13 1434 16.67% 638 28.29% $939,623,966.50 25.87% 15.57% 15.53%
FY 14 1724 18.85% 707 28.79% $1,068,019,124.40 25.64% 15.31% 15.22%





















Share of New 
SDVOSB Awards 
Spending







FY 05 2 0.25% 2 0.46% $480,126.21 0.28% 0.21% 0.28%
FY 06 9 0.95% 7 1.54% $4,763,700.41 2.68% 1.70% 2.20%
FY 07 42 3.24% 39 7.01% $10,406,976.52 3.95% 2.63% 2.66%
FY 08 81 4.72% 65 9.91% $72,295,571.00 16.34% 10.46% 10.77%
FY 09 138 6.99% 75 9.72% $134,494,946.69 29.11% 17.05% 16.89%
FY 10 192 9.06% 95 11.06% $183,989,439.08 27.22% 16.10% 15.60%
FY 11 214 9.69% 134 14.35% $216,921,785.72 22.39% 14.56% 14.98%
FY 12 211 9.03% 123 12.79% $137,938,487.02 15.77% 9.48% 9.80%
FY 13 215 9.84% 119 14.48% $192,141,419.27 24.81% 13.73% 13.76%
FY 14 206 9.52% 120 12.63% $191,198,627.65 22.54% 12.18% 10.81%
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contracting participation is also much greater.  However, it is still only a minor 
share of total DOD and DON SDVOSB New Awards.  Moreover, over the last 
several years, these set-asides’ contribution to DOD and DON SDVOSB 
participation and spending appears to have stalled or declined. The DOD Strategic 
Plans’ alignment of SDVOSB competitive set-aside awards to contracting-
opportunity objectives of EO 13360 appears to have been barely maintained.  This is 
also not surprising, in light of the 2009 date of the last DOD SDVOSB Strategic 
Plan.  However, DOD appears to be much farther ahead of DON in terms of using 
competitive SDVOSB set-asides and expanding participation in them.  This may 
help explain DOD’s goal achievement success which DON is yet to achieve.  DOD is 
poised to increase this gap still further in light of recent competitive set-aside 
increases, unless DON takes aggressive action to catch up.                   
 
4. DOD and DON Combined SDVOSB Set-Aside Awards (Total 
SDVOSB Program) and Their Impact. 
Data in two Tables below illustrates DOD and DON utilization of the total SDVOSB 
Program, i.e. the combined sole source and competitive SDVOSB set-asides.  This data 
includes IDV as well as Open Market awards.  Data shows declined or stagnated use of 
SDVOSB Program’s New Awards authorities at both DOD and DON as a share of all 
New Awards (with the exception of FY2013 and 2014 DOD use). 
 
Data also shows that, as a means for helping service-disabled veterans break into the 
defense contracting market, the usefulness of SDVOSB Program set-asides has plateaued 
half-way into the assessment period.  Despite the EO 13360, the 2009 DOD Strategic 
Plan and related training and outreach initiatives, the share of SDVOSB set-asides in total 
SDVOSB net spending as well in New Awards and Goaling spending has been in long-
term decline at DOD since FY2010.  At DON, this decline commenced in either FY2009 
or FY2010, depending on the spending category. 
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Table 11. DOD New SDVOSB All Set-Aside Award Trends; Impact on Market 
Entry and SDVOSB Spending. 
 
Table 12. DON New SDVOSB All Set-Aside Award Trends; Impact on Market 
Entry and SDVOSB Spending. 
Findings:  In relative terms, DOD at large utilizes the SDVOSB Program New 
































FY 05 10 0.23% 10 0.69% $5,235,662.21 0.69% 0.50% 0.47%
FY 06 158 3.27% 158 9.95% $127,864,822.10 12.72% 8.23% 8.06%
FY 07 718 13.49% 493 28.97% $188,551,350.19 14.35% 9.46% 10.14%
FY 08 1361 17.41% 774 34.43% $626,375,475.21 29.06% 19.27% 20.11%
FY 09 1367 15.90% 810 32.71% $807,676,507.98 30.22% 18.88% 18.67%
FY 10 1535 16.31% 845 30.69% $1,108,479,164.06 34.12% 22.38% 20.90%
FY 11 1420 15.28% 790 28.85% $1,118,807,288.17 31.18% 20.28% 19.14%
FY 12 1463 15.75% 766 29.10% $1,016,670,339.99 25.17% 16.68% 15.87%
FY 13 1521 17.68% 690 30.60% $970,494,193.20 26.72% 16.08% 16.04%
FY 14 1818 19.88% 761 30.99% $1,111,110,741.55 26.68% 15.92% 15.84%































FY 05 2 0.25% 2 0.46% $480,126.21 0.28% 0.21% 0.28%
FY 06 14 1.48% 12 2.64% $5,593,236.41 3.15% 1.99% 2.58%
FY 07 85 6.55% 68 12.23% $15,845,626.68 6.02% 4.00% 4.05%
FY 08 120 6.99% 89 13.57% $89,096,003.05 20.14% 12.89% 13.27%
FY 09 184 9.32% 112 14.51% $149,555,398.54 32.37% 18.96% 18.78%
FY 10 239 11.27% 129 15.02% $199,401,453.66 29.50% 17.45% 16.90%
FY 11 245 11.10% 157 16.81% $228,912,449.95 23.63% 15.36% 15.80%
FY 12 240 10.27% 145 15.07% $150,529,438.65 17.21% 10.34% 10.70%
FY 13 242 11.07% 141 17.15% $202,161,239.86 26.11% 14.45% 14.48%
FY 14 238 10.99% 147 15.47% $205,609,669.30 24.24% 13.10% 11.62%
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impact than DON.  This may well help explain DOD’s and DON’s relative standing 
in terms of SDVOSB goal achievement.  However, both DOD and DON, however, 
have overseen a long-term decline in the SDVOSB Program New Awards’ 
contribution to Goaling spending.  This trend suggests disconnect between the 
statutory justification for the SDVOSB Program authorities and their actual use in 
the field.  Significantly, this trend occurs in the years during which DOD has ceased 
to issue any more SDVOSB Strategic Plans after the January 2009 DOD Strategic 
Plan.  It appears that Contracting Officers and executives in the field may have 
interpreted the cessation of new Strategic Plans as change in direction and/or 
leadership vacuum regarding the use of the SDVOSB Program.  Neither the 
confirmations of buyer discretion stemming from the 2010 Small Business Jobs Act 
nor the GAO mandate for exercise of this discretion in the 2012 Split Rock case 
appear to have been insufficient by themselves to reverse this trend.                 
 
5. DOD and DON SDVOSB Simplified Acquisition Procedures (SAP) 
Awards and Their Impact. 
Data in two Figures below suggests that another process, FAR Part 13 Simplified 
Acquisitions, has generally played a more positive role in bringing in new SDVOSBs into 
DOD and DON contracting than the SDVOSB Program.  Since FY2011, a majority of 
SDVOSB New Awardees at DOD received SAP awards.  At DON, however, only in 
FY2013 did the majority of SDVOSB New Awardees received SAP awards.  At DOD, 
SAP now accounts for the majority of New Awards; DON is less SAP-friendly in that 
regard.  In term of New Awards, Total, and Goaling Report spending categories, SAP 
New Awards exceed SDVOSB sole source awards in every category.  
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Table 13. DOD SAP Awards and Their Impact on SDVOSB Market Entry and 
SDVOSB Spending. 
 
Table 14. DON SAP Awards and Their Impact on SDVOSB Market Entry and 
SDVOSB Spending. 
Findings:  SAP became a broad-based path into DOD and DON contracting for 
SDVOSB firms, overtaking the SDVOSB Program in terms of participation and 
SDVOSB sole sources in terms of spending.  This trend appears to validate the 2005 


































FY 05 2398 54.39% 1039 72.05% $169,117,905.21 22.20% 16.07% 15.28%
FY 06 464 9.59% 857 53.97% $122,053,714.76 12.15% 7.85% 7.70%
FY 07 28 0.53% 11 0.65% $2,835,360.21 0.22% 0.14% 0.15%
FY 08 11 0.14% 10 0.44% $1,347,737.60 0.06% 0.04% 0.04%
FY 09 6 0.07% 6 0.24% $995,452.71 0.04% 0.02% 0.02%
FY 10 1886 20.03% 1002 36.40% $198,879,487.81 6.12% 4.02% 3.75%
FY 11 3248 34.94% 1464 53.47% $288,016,823.61 5.19% 5.22% 4.93%
FY 12 3765 40.53% 1483 56.34% $284,690,662.76 7.05% 4.67% 4.44%
FY 13 4416 51.34% 1331 59.02% $416,013,773.62 11.45% 6.89% 6.88%
FY 14 5120 55.98% 1346 54.80% $468,344,284.31 12.78% 7.63% 6.68%




































FY 05 490 60.79% 306 70.02% $31,905,485.21 18.35% 14.12% 18.67%
FY 06 464 48.95% 239 52.64% $15,751,617.76 8.87% 5.61% 7.26%
FY 07 15 1.16% 2 0.36% $546,690.00 0.21% 0.14% 0.14%
FY 08 1 0.06% 1 0.15% $15,300.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
FY 09 0 0.00% 0 0.00% $0.00 0.00% 0.00% 0.00%
FY 10 444 20.94% 233 27.12% $39,515,448.08 5.85% 3.46% 3.35%
FY 11 824 37.32% 435 46.57% $49,713,048.39 5.13% 3.34% 3.43%
FY 12 942 40.33% 450 46.78% $51,930,315.08 5.94% 3.57% 3.69%
FY 13 873 39.94% 428 52.07% $52,654,789.03 6.80% 3.76% 3.77%
FY 14 943 43.56% 450 47.37% $75,794,667.01 8.93% 4.83% 4.29%
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However, DON should increase its SAP awards with SDVOSBs to match or exceed 
DOD levels.   
C. SDVOSB PROGRAM TAXONOMY: OUTPUTS – TRENDS ON SDVOSBS 
PARTICIPATION IN DOD AND DON CONTRACTING. 
To examine the significance of participation in the SDVOSB Program, it is important not 
only to examine participation trends, but to put those trends in the context of SDVOSB 
population at large.  Then, participation trends by agency and various contract types 
should be examined.    
1. SDV Self-Employment and Contracting Registration Trends. 
According to the National Center for Veterans Analysis and Statistics (NCVAS),
139
 over 
the last decade the United States has experienced a swelling SDV population which has 
growing needs for professional and societal integration as well as economic 
independence. Specifically, between FY2004 and FY2013, the number of SDVs has 
grown from approximately 2.5 million to approximately 3.8 million in 2012, a 152 
percent increase. On the contrary, the overall veteran population declined from about 26 
million to about 21 million during the same time period.  Thus, SDVs have come to 
account for over 18 percent of the total veteran population instead of just over 10 percent.    
As of FY12, the number of 0-20 percent rated SDVs have remained relatively constant at 
slightly over 1.3 million people, while the numbers of higher-rated SDVs has increased, 
with 70-100 percent rating population approaching 1 million,  the 30-40 percent rating 
population reaching about 0.6 million, and the 50-60 percent rating population reaching 
about 0.4 million.   The support expenditures have far outpaced the SDV population 
growth.  By comparison, the SDVOSB Program is much smaller in fiscal outlays and in 
the target portion of SDV population.   
                                                 






Figure 9. Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) Data on Service-Disabled Veteran 
Population Growth. 
According to the September 2014 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics 
data,
140
 there have been 1,379,000 SDVs in the workforce as of August 2013.  SDVs 
have a lower self-employment participation rate than non-SDVs (5.8 percent to 7.4 
percent), but, even so, there were 79,982 SDVOBs in the country as of that time.  The 
SBA Office of Advocacy, relying on the 2007 Census data collected for June 2011, 
reported there were 196,760 SDVOBs at that time, 41,245 of which had employees and 
155,515 of which had none.
141
     
                                                 
140 U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, Economic News Release, Table 8. 
Employer Persons 18 Years and Over by Veteran Status, Presence of Service-Connected Disability, Period 
of Service, and Class of Worker, August 2012, Not Seasonally Adjusted (Sept. 08, 2014), available at: 
http://data.bls.gov/cgi-bin/print.pl/news.release/vet.t08.htm.  
141 U.S. SBA OFFICE OF ADVOCACY, VETERAN-OWNED BUSINESSES AND THEIR OWNERS: DATA FROM THE 




Figure 10. SBA, Census, and Bureau of Labor Statistics Data on SDV Population in 
the Workforce, Including Self-Employment. 
SDVOSB registration data suggests that the Federal and DOD SDVOSB 
Procurement Programs are well-known in the SDV entrepreneur community, but 
that disillusionment with them may be widespread. From July 2004 to January 2015, 
the SDVOSB population registered to do business with the Federal Government in the 
CCR/SAM databases has grown from 5,600 active registrations to 15,751 active and 
35,324 inactive registrations, along with 61 active and inactive registrations that have 
been legally excluded from government contracting.
142
  When registrations are compared 
to the number of SDVOBs (admittedly, with a difference in timing of data collection), a 
real picture of disillusionment emerges. Using the BLS numbers, it appears that two-
thirds of all SDVOBs have tried Federal contracting, but that only about 20 percent 
stayed active while about 44 percent dropped out of looking for contracts or subcontracts.  
For every remaining SDVOB firm looking for Federal contracts or subcontracts, 2.24 
SDVOSBs are no longer looking.  Some of the inactive registrations may be due to 
business sales, life events, outgrowth of business size, etc., but the sheer numbers lead to 
further questions concerning the historical participation in the DOD SDVOSB Program.  
Using the SBA/Census numbers, just 8 percent of SDVOBs are looking, while 18 percent 
stopped looking. 
                                                 
142 See U.S. GENERAL SERVICES ADMINISTRATION, Central Contractor Registration (CCR), formerly 
available at: https://www.ccr.gov, and transitioned on July 30, 2012 to the System for Award Management 
(SAM), available at: https://www.sam.gov. 
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Figure 11. SDVOSB Seekers of Federal Contracts: SAM.gov/CCR Registrations. 
Findings: Self-employed service-disabled veterans (SDVs) appear to be largely 
bypassing the Federal SDVOSB Program; of those SDVs that tried it, a substantial 
majority has eventually given up.       
 
2. SDVOSB Participation in DOD and DON Contracting Overall. 
Data below illustrates the participation rates of SDVOSBs in the DOD and DON 
SDVOSB contracting overall as well as the SDVOSB Program.  Participant categories 
include New Awardees (recipients of all SDVOSB contract actions identified as 
“Modification 0” in FPDS during a given Fiscal Year); Net Revenue Earner Firms 
(SDVOSBs that received net positive contract revenue in a given Fiscal Year from new 
awards and/or accretive modifications, taking into account any deductive modifications 
such as close-outs of unexpended funds, cancellations, terminations, or deductive 
changes); and Negative and Neutral Revenue Firms (firms that received net negative or 
net zero contract revenue in a given Fiscal Year).  
 
Data in two Figures below, as compared with data from the previous section, shows that 
just under 4 percent of total SDVOSB population participate in the DOD SDVOSB 
Procurement Program. This amounts to a little less than 20 percent of those actively 
looking.  Just about 7 percent of the actively looking SDVOSB population participates in 
DON procurement market.   
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Participation in the DOD SDVOSB Program has peaked in FY2010 for New Awardees 
and in FY2011 for Net Revenue Earners, and has been dropping until FY2014.  But the 
FY2014 upturn was slight: less SDVOSBs have received new DOD contracts that year 
than in the years FY2009, FY2010, FY2011, and FY2012; the number of Net Revenue 
Earners is still at level below FY2010, FY2011, and FY2012.  Participation in the DON 
SDVOSB Program has peaked in FY2012 for both New Awardees and Net Revenue 
Earners; in FY2014, it is still below that level.   
 
A comparative match to earlier spending Figures would provide valuable 
perspective here.  The number of SDVOSB participants in either category has never 
doubled from FY05, even though SDVOSB spending has grown approximately six 
(6) times in terms of new award revenues and approximately seven (7) times in 
terms of net SDVOSB spending.  At DON, New Awardee and Net Revenue Earner 
numbers have more than doubled from FY2005, while the Net Total Spending 
increased about 6 times and New Awards spending grew about 5 times.  The DOD 
and DON SDVOSB Program appears to begin concentrating the spending among a 
limited number of firms.  The number of SDVOSBs with negative and neutral revenues, 
on the other hand, has peaked in FY2013 for both DOD and DON.  The share of DOD 
New Awardees (FY2005 and FY2014 data) as part of closest available active 
registrations (2004 and 2015 calendar years data) has dropped from approximately 25 
percent to approximately 15 percent. This may mean that SDVOSBs are diversifying to 
other agencies, but may also mean that new awards are now harder to come by and 
veterans are walking away from the Program. 
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Figure 12. SDVOSB Participation Trends in DOD Contracting Overall. 
 
Figure 13. SDVOSB Participation Trends in DON Contracting Overall. 
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Findings: DOD and DON are experiencing a decline in SDVOSB participation in 
their respective contracting markets; in other words, DOD and DON may well begin 
running out of SDVOSB contractors in the near future.  This trend is much more 
serious and pronounced at DOD, while DON’s trend appears substantially 
influenced by sequestration.  At the same time, the SDVOSB Program is not a major 
contributor to encouraging SDVOSB participation in DOD and DON contracting 
markets.  DON even experienced reduced participation in SAP set-asides, which 
correlates with the aftermath of the Marine Corps Kingdomware case.  Not only are 
these trends contrary to broad-based business development, but they also raise 
doubts over the strategic ability of DOD and DON to meet or exceed the 3 percent 
SDVOSB statutory goal in the long term.        
 
3. SDVOSB Program Participation at DOD and DON. 
Data below illustrates the SDVOSB Program participation trends as a consequence of 
Contracting Officer’s discretion to set aside or not set aside work for SDVOSBs on a 
competitive or sole source basis.  The participation trends show a declining and/or 
stagnating level of Program outputs, depending on the effect given the FY2014 data.  The 
number of SDVOSB sole source awardees has been declining at DOD since FY2008 and 
DON since FY2009.  The number of SAP SDVOSB sole source awardee has generally 
stagnated since FY2010, with recent slight increases.  The only hopeful trend, with the 
potential to redirect the Program’s overall performance, is the growth in the number of 
SAP competitive SDVOSB set-aside awardees at DOD. At DON, SAP set-aside 
awardees numbers have been dropping. Overall, this data shows that DOD and DON 
Contracting Officers are not exercising discretion to increase the total count of SDVOSBs 
in the SDVOSB Program.       
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Figure 15. DON SDVOSB Program Participation: Trends in Contracting Officer 
Discretion. 
Findings: There is a crisis of participation in DOD and DON SDVOSB Program.  
Except for SAP sole source awardees, all Program participation indicators have 
stagnated or decreased over time.  With the exception of DOD SDVOSB SAP set-
asides, the SDVOSB Program does not appear to be serving as the entryway into 
DOD or DON markets.   DON should take urgent action to reverse these trends. 
 
4. SDVOSB Program and Non-Program Participation: Open Market 
versus IDVs. 
Another Program and non-Program participation data set shows substantial gap between 
the number of Open Market awardees and Open Market SDVOSB set-aside awardees.  
The same data set also shows favorable trends in the number of IDV order awardees 
winning work outside the SDVOSB set-asides.  DOD data suggests that the 2010 Small 
Business Jobs Act legislation confirming discretionary IDV SDVOSB set-asides 
authority had a much smaller effect than the effect of precedential decisions, Task Force 
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Reports, and regulations favoring established firms regardless of set-asides.  At DON, 
however, there appears to be a realignment of SDVOSBs form Open Market to IDVs in 
terms of overall awards.  In terms of SDVOSB set-asides, this realignment occurred at 
both DOD and DON.  Data also suggests that DOD and DON, operating under initial 
DOD Strategic Plans, succeeded in increasing Open Market SDVOSB set-aside 
participation so that SDVOSBs can use it as past performance record for future IDV 
participation.   
 
Figure 16. SDVOSB Program and Non-Program Participation in DOD Contracting: 
Open Market v. IDV Orders. 
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Figure 17. SDVOSB Program and Non-Program Participation in DON Contracting: 
Open Market v. IDV Orders. 
Findings: Once the 2010 Small Business Jobs Act confirmed legal authority for IDV 
SDVOSB set-asides, DOD and DON buyers began favoring SDVOSB set-aside 
seekers holding IDVs over set-aside seekers in the Open Market.  There is also a 
tendency to match (at DOD) or exceed (at DON) the number of SDVOSB IDV 
contractors as compared to the number of SDVOSB Open Market contractors.  
These trends may suggest greater success of SDVOSBs at the pursuit of IDVs, but 
may also be indicative of the Program’s entrenchment problem raised by academic 
critics.       
D. SDVOSB PROGRAM TAXONOMY: OUTCOMES – TRENDS RELATED 
TO SDVOSB CAPACITY AND POST-PROGRAM STAYING POWER. 
Except for provisions in the 1999 and the 2003 legislation that were relegated to U.S. 
code notes and the April 2007 (subsequently limited) Knowledge Connections COFC 
opinion, there appears to be no existing law, regulation, order, plan, policy, or court 
precedent that creates an outputs-centric or outcome-centric SDVOSB Procurement 
Program design.  Instead, the overriding focus is on the inputs (meeting goals), even to 
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the exclusion of new, developing, or multiple SDVOSBs.  The market research and 
source selection processes are so uncertain that they make it difficult for buyers to 
exercise discretion in favor of SDVOSB set-asides.  As the above authorities show, 
growing the pool of capable SDVOSBs is not a recognized factor in award decisions, and 
is a limited, easily-superseded factor in acquisition strategies. Business development for 
specific SDVOSBs or groups of SDVOSBs is not a stated factor at all.  Although there 
are no stated business development metrics for SDVOSB contracting or the SDVOSB 
Program, some possible metrics are addressed below.    
1. DOD and DON Awards Capacity-Related Trends.  
One possible business development outcome metric concerns the size of possible award 
capacity expectations on the part of SDVOSB firms (as well as Contracting Officers 
looking for SDVOSB firms with experience).  To examine possible expectation trends, 
the two Figures and two Tables below contain measures of actual award averages 
(means) and medians across contract award types.  The average values are influenced by 
extreme data points (i.e., the very high or the very low awards), while the medians simply 
provide the middle award data value from among all awards made but not the range of 
distribution of the award values. From the standpoint of statistics, there are many 
measurements of central tendency that could be applied to explain DOD and DON 
SDVOSB contracting practices.  The choice of these measurements usually depends on 
the perceived accuracy of the precise typical or representative award values that those 
measurements produce.  Such comparisons are beyond the scope of this study. Data 
below does not seek to represent or determine typical award values; rather, its purpose is 
to illustrate the differences in award values across Open Market and IDV contract award 
types even with the extreme-value influences.
143
        
 
                                                 
143 For a representative discussion of related statistics principles, see generally Paul von Hippel, Mean, 
Median, and Skew: Correcting a Textbook Rule, 13 JOURNAL OF STATISTICS EDUCATION, No. 2 (2005), 
available at: http://www.amstat.org/publications/jse/v13n2/vonhippel.html; UNIVERSITY OF TEXAS, 
Common Mistakes in Using Statistics: Summary Statistics for Skewed Distributions (2015), available at:  
http://www.ma.utexas.edu/users/mks/statmistakes/skeweddistributions.html; and LAERD STATISTICS, 
Measures of Central Tendency (2015), available at: https://statistics.laerd.com/statistical-guides/measures-
central-tendency-mean-mode-median.php. 
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Data below suggests that neither Open Market awards nor Open Market set-asides 
provide comparable experience to SDVOSBs in terms of award value as that provided by 
IDVs.  On the contrary, IDV set-aside orders historically provided comparable or greater 
experience in terms of IDV award values.  Once firms were successful enough to land an 
IDV, their success was reinforced.   There are drastic disparities in median SDVOSB set-
aside values, particularly at DOD.  This suggests a very positive trend in terms of 
availability of low-dollar set-asides suitable for initial agency market entry, but also 
a negative trend in terms of capacity-building for firms seeking transition from 
Open Market to IDVs.    
 
Since FY2008 for DON and FY2009 for DOD, the differences between Open Market and 
IDV projects size generally held fairly constant.  This data demonstrates that SDVOSBs 
are fully capable of participating in the IDVs alongside the most experienced firms in 
other small and large business categories.  (Note, however, that IDV New Award values 
may reflect artificially low minimum ordering quantities.) In terms of assistance, data 
appears to support the academic predictions of greater business development assistance 




Figure 18. Capacity Growth Potential: DOD SDVOSB Program and Non-Program 
Average and Median Award Values. 
 
Table 15. Capacity Growth Potential: DOD SDVOSB Program and Non-Program 
































FY 05 $321,678.81 $189,642.37 $840,056.57 $1,024,452.00 $18,485.50 $177,660.00 $40,294.00 $352,228.00
FY 06 $378,751.63 $645,255.61 $934,147.53 $1,725,644.05 $19,276.00 $46,969.00 $43,752.50 $114,111.00
FY 07 $404,082.70 $254,998.89 $1,233,460.95 $952,256.69 $21,903.50 $34,285.00 $50,490.00 $301,286.00
FY 08 $555,797.08 $396,153.20 $1,500,609.59 $620,859.71 $24,897.00 $40,035.00 $46,819.00 $228,925.50
FY 09 $551,470.58 $534,350.79 $1,760,333.15 $2,185,224.87 $23,021.83 $41,060.00 $62,085.56 $223,770.73
FY 10 $619,261.53 $630,972.51 $1,797,291.21 $2,501,574.25 $24,820.00 $47,475.00 $63,809.76 $201,205.24
FY 11 $709,098.65 $699,223.84 $1,320,603.99 $2,472,002.49 $23,968.47 $56,932.60 $68,919.78 $222,605.33
FY 12 $820,726.59 $628,666.12 $2,053,295.82 $2,294,153.15 $24,423.34 $43,779.42 $84,323.47 $236,194.51
FY 13 $816,431.83 $840,046.61 $2,087,057.71 $1,867,787.61 $24,462.50 $39,849.06 $90,927.07 $178,775.73
FY 14 $676,341.32 $504,257.35 $1,662,380.90 $1,704,577.41 $25,266.00 $32,235.50 $67,685.07 $220,350.04
Capacity Growth Potential: DOD SDVOSB Program and Non-Program Average and Median Award Values Combined 
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Figure 19. Capacity Growth Potential: DON SDVOSB Program and Non-Program 
Average and Median Award Values. 
 
Table 16. Capacity Growth Potential: DON SDVOSB Program and Non-Program 
Average and Median Award Values Combined. 
Findings:  Clearly, there are SDVOSBs able to handle high-capacity work. Open 
Market New Awards, including SDVOSB set-aside awards, tend to require (and 





























FY 05 $121,025.59 $240,063.11 $407,086.67 $0.00 $13,743.50 $240,063.11 $52,012.00 $0.00
FY 06 $107,740.41 $457,046.70 $304,684.35 $54,338.00 $10,051.50 $60,784.00 $57,308.50 $54,338.00
FY 07 $141,476.56 $174,797.38 $446,771.01 $770,845.89 $21,903.50 $301,286.00 $50,490.00 $34,285.00
FY 08 $184,994.80 $317,117.77 $453,513.83 $1,077,535.95 $24,897.00 $40,035.00 $46,819.00 $228,925.50
FY 09 $186,279.76 $362,949.56 $542,318.56 $1,029,845.28 $23,021.83 $41,060.00 $62,085.56 $223,770.73
FY 10 $209,301.46 $428,712.92 $555,606.47 $1,109,421.85 $24,820.00 $47,475.00 $63,809.76 $201,205.24
FY 11 $226,193.78 $444,317.03 $663,481.80 $1,296,442.53 $23,968.47 $56,932.60 $68,919.78 $222,605.33
FY 12 $272,826.42 $413,374.99 $679,605.36 $1,020,012.53 $24,423.34 $43,779.42 $84,323.47 $236,194.51
FY 13 $220,596.19 $550,933.48 $482,560.65 $922,848.92 $18,080.03 $108,000.00 $83,289.78 $283,516.79
FY 14 $180,760.34 $368,108.49 $573,200.13 $1,008,886.65 $18,270.00 $114,807.25 $89,846.64 $296,141.73
Capacity Growth Potential: DON SDVOSB Program and Non-Program Average and Median Award Values Combined
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average and median award values for SDVOSB unrestricted and set-aside awards in 
the Open Market and on IDVs raise questions as to whether there SDVOSBs are 
afforded adequate capacity-building through the SDVOSB Program.   
In terms of capacity-building, DON SDVOSB set-asides on IDVs appear to have 
been used backwards (this also occurred at DOD at large from time to time). 
Instead of using IDV SDVOSB set-asides to expand the capacity of SDVOSB firms 
to handle unrestricted IDV work, DON buyers appear to have required success at 
unrestricted IDV work first before significant work under IDV SDVOSB set-asides 
can be obtained.  This approach appears consistent with the second, December 2007, 
COFC opinion in Knowledge Connections (but not with the first, April 2007, 
opinion).  However, this means that IDV SDVOSB set-asides appear to function not 
as a business development mechanism, but as a reward mechanism for already-
successful firms.   
 
2. Staying Power of SDVO Contractor Firms that Outgrew Small 
Business Size Caps. 
Data in two Figures below illustrates the outcome of the current SDVOSB Program 
design in terms of building successful SDVO businesses.  At issue is the staying power of 
SDVO firms which were formerly SDVOSBs.  Once an SDVO firm outgrows small 
business size caps, it is no longer eligible to participate in the SDVOSB Program.  
Essentially, such a firm becomes an SDVOSB Program/SDVOSB contracting graduate.  
It appears that the number of SDVO firms receiving large business awards has been 
decreasing over the last 4 years at DOD and over the last 5 years at DON.  Although 
SDVOLBs and SDVOSBs are not identical populations, the SDVOLBs number can be 
approximated to 8.5 percent of new SDVOSB awardees at DOD or approximately 6.4 
percent at DON.  This is not indicative of broad-based business development success, but 
suggests other possibilities such as the firms’ self-imposed growth limits and/or limited 
ability of the SDVOSB Program to prepare firms for full and open competition.             
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Figure 20. Staying Power of SDVOLBs in DOD Contracting: SDVOSBs Which 
Outgrew Small Business Size Caps. 
 
Figure 21. Staying Power of SDVOLBs in DON Contracting: SDVOSBs Which 
Outgrew Small Business Size Caps. 
Findings:  The alumni population of the SDVOSB Program (or SDVOSB 
contracting as a whole) receiving New Awards has been dwindling over the recent 
years at DOD and DON.  This suggests lack of broad-based business development 
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sufficient to prepare SDVO firms for success outside of Small Business Act 
contracting.  This trend began earlier at DON than at DOD at large. 
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VI. ANSWERS TO RESEARCH QUESTIONS; 
RECOMMENDATIONS ON STRATEGIC USE OF SIMPLIFIED 
ACQUISITIONS. 
Thanks to the helpful theoretical framework, this study represents the first known 
attempt to look at the DOD and DON SDVOSB contracting from the perspective of 
an individual service-disabled veteran looking to government contracting as a 
means of successful transition to economic empowerment.  The study has succeeded 
in asking and answering several important questions in that regard.   
 
With regards to the first question, whether the SDVOSB Program’s operations, 
successes, and challenges can be better explained in terms of the generally accepted 
Cohen-Eimicke Contract Management Performance Model, the answer is a definite 
“yes.”  This study validates the significance of distinctions drawn by Cohen and Eimicke 
between inputs, process, outputs, and outcomes for measuring the performance of 
contracting program.  In total spending terms, this Program has delivered substantial 
prime contracting dollars to its beneficiary firms.  DOD and DON can rightfully take 
credit for this spending record.  However, important collateral issues persist.  These 
issues not only include DON missing the 3 percent goal, but also a number of issues 
affecting the role, significance, and effects of the SDVOSB Program.   
 
Viewed through the prism of the Cohen-Eimicke model, the DOD/DON SDVOSB 
Program has operated exactly as it was designed: to deliver funds towards the 3 
percent goal through contract spending with most successful firms that need the 
least targeted assistance.  The 2003 Congressional compromise may have enabled the 
existence of the SDVOSB Program, but at the price of effectiveness in achieving its 
avowed policy objectives and overall justifications.  Neither the Executive Order 13360 
nor the DOD Strategic Plans have brought sufficient clarity to discretionary processes or 
sufficient emphasis on process, output, or outcome measures; nor have the Order and 
Plans created the contracting capacity required for SDVOSB business development 
through government contracting.  The 2010-2012 Interagency Task Force renewed the 
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focus on delivering the most funds (inputs) to the most successful firms (outputs).  
Likewise, the Small Business Jobs Act of 2010 and implementing regulations simply 
confirmed the buying agencies’ discretion to fund the already successful firms.  The 
SDVOSB Procurement Program’s Congressional, regulatory, and policy designs 
emphasize inputs, i.e. the transactionally-easiest delivery of the greatest spending.  
However, those designs consistently leave unclear the process question of when and 
why a Contracting Officer would exercise his or her individual discretion to assist 
particular SDVOSBs.  The Program’s process design and execution are therefore 
inherently unstable and contradictory.  Further, significant policy gaps exist in the 
SDVOSB Program related to various questions that were not immediately foreseen at the 
time of its creation, such as the impact of sequestration or greater use of Simplified 
Acquisitions.            
 
The pressure of the SDVOSB firms for interpretation of SDVOSB Program rules in 
favor of meaningful business development assistance lead to attempts by the GAO 
and COFC to impose the Program designs through precedents. In 2007-early 2008, 
those attempts produced favorable precedents, but those precedents were overruled 
within about a year from issuance.  As a result, all current SDVOSB Program 
designs make it unclear and even undesirable for individual Contracting Officers to 
undertake set-aside awards. Predictably, DOD and DON Contracting Officers have 
been making less and less SDVOSB set-aside awards, and even less New Awards of all 
kinds, in recent years.  Only in FY2014 did the DOD increase competitive and New 
Awards, with the resulting goal achievement success.                     
 
Meanwhile, the population of outputs, i.e., the numbers of SDVOSB firms earning DOD 
contract revenue or receiving New Awards from DOD, has been diminishing over time 
and is presently stagnant at the 6-year old level.  The number of DON SDVOSB revenue 
earners and New Awardees is below the 3-year old level.  Without more contract 
awards of the type that can serve as entry paths into DOD/DON procurement and 
without more participating SDVOSB firms, the SDVOSB Program can be expected 
to generate more disillusionment within the veteran community even as DOD and 
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DON are maintaining or approaching the 3 percent goal achievement.  This may be a 
particularly acute problem for DON. 
 
This study shows that the SDVOSB Program operates less as a veterans’ 
“assistance” program or a business development program, but more as an 
additional, soft preference for the pool of SDVOSB firms that appear to be generally 
capable of thriving within the non-SDVOSB procurement processes at DOD and 
DON.  This validates the assessments by Schooner, Sherman, Korsak, McGann, as well 
as Cox and Moore that the SDVOSB Program’s design is geared to benefit established, 
successful, already-resourced firms.  It would be entirely proper for Congress and the 
Executive Branch to re-align the design elements of the Program so that the process 
becomes more veteran-centric and so that the Program can become focused on outputs 
and outcomes, not simply on inputs.   
 
As to the second question, whether broad and unguided individual-level Contracting 
Officer discretion the right mechanism to support SDVOSB participation in Defense, 
Navy, and Marine Corps contracting, the answer is a resounding “no.”  As already 
stated above, FPDS data demonstrated that DOD and DON Contracting Officers are 
growing in reluctance to exercise discretion to conduct or fund set-asides, particularly in 
Open Market acquisitions.  These findings refute the criticism of Schooner and Sherman 
that the SDVOSB Program created a unique, undue burden on the Federal procurement 
system – but only to the extent the Program appears to be not used.  This is for reasons of 
structural design compromises imposed by Congress, regulators, and tribunals, and not 
for any lack of care for service-disabled veterans by DOD or DON buyers.  The DOD 
Program’s spending volume success is based on the foundation of early successful DOD 
Strategic Plans, as well as peak awards and peak participation reached half-way into the 
Program’s history.  The Interagency Task Force changed the emphasis towards utilizing 
the same established SDVOSBs across multiple DOD buying activities and commands 
maximized near-term goal achievement directed in statutory law and EO 13360.  
However, this approach made little headway in developing the bench of newly capable 
SDVOSB firms or removing entry barriers for veterans seeking self-employment. 
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Individual-level discretion in the awarding of new set-asides cannot address 
challenges in the SDVOSB Program’s systemic direction and its cloudy strategic 
future. The reality is that, over the last four fiscal years, DOD and DON SDVOSB 
spending has been increasingly maintained not through new awards, but through 
accretive modifications such as exercised options or added requirements.  Because 
DOD/DON contracts are generally limited to 5 years,
144
 the overall DOD/DON spending 
on SDVOSBs is on track for long-term decline unless new awards are drastically 
expanded.  With regards to all DOD New Awards, all indicators such as spending 
volume, number of awards, and number of New Awardee firms have been steadily 
dropping, except for the last year.  DON has similar, if less pronounced, trends. With 
regards to DOD and DON SDVOSB New Awards recipients, participation has been 
dropping in recent years, while Program New Awards spending has dropped either 
slowly (DOD) or sharply (DON).  Thus, a decade into the SDVOSB Program’s 
existence, its greatest challenge is once again the creation of a steady, growing 
pipeline of up-and-coming SDVOSB contractors.  The Program is coming full circle.    
 
In terms if impact on overall SDVOSB awards, market entry, and goaling spending, 
the SDVOSB Program is a minority contributor.  This holds for competitive as well as 
sole source set-asides individually and combined. However, the set-aside SDVOSB 
Program has been consistently a greater contributor at DOD than at DON, which 
helps explain DOD’s goal achievement.   
 
As to the third question, whether FAR Part 13 Simplified Acquisitions can positively 
influence SDVOSB Program outcomes, the answer is “yes, and can influence even 
more with appropriate targeting of buyers’ discretion.”  SAP New Awards appear to 
be already supplementing and even supplanting the SDVOSB Program as the key to 
opening the door for SDVs into the DOD and DON procurement markets.  At the 
inception of the SDVOSB Program, SAP accounted for the majority of DOD and DON 
awards.  DON was originally leading DOD in the share of SAP awards, but the trend was 
recently reversed.  As a result, SDVOSBs are more likely to gain experience with DOD 
                                                 
144 For contract length terms and possible extensions, see generally 10 U.S.C. §§ 2304a and 2306b (2014). 
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contracting through SAP than with DON contracting.  With improvements discussed 
below, the role of SAP as a key that opens doors to SDVOSB participation in defense 
procurement and greater business development could be further strengthened.      
 
This study substantiated its research hypothesis, namely, that the Federal/DOD/DON 
SDVOSB Procurement Program suffers from fundamentally deficient designs.  From 
the government perspective, the SDVOSB Program operates exactly as it was designed: 
enabling the buyers to choose the path of least transactional effort and risk in channeling 
the spending that counts for goal achievement purposes.  Such a Program may fall short 
of the 3 percent goal or reach it after a decade of trying (as the DON and the DOD have 
done in FY2014, respectively).  But, either way, from the perspective of individual 
service-disabled veteran entrepreneurs looking to participate in defense contracting, 
the Program malfunctions and its long-term success is in doubt because of design 
features that neglect intentional growth of SDVOSB participation.  This is the 
explanation for the apparent paradox between DOD goal achievement and the academic 
concerns of participant entrenchment, buyer confusion, and veteran community 
disillusionment stemming from prior assessments and studies of the SDVOSB Program.   
 
Even as the number of SDVOSBs registered to do business with the Federal government 
increased 300 percent over the decade since EO 13360, SDVOSB participation in the 
Program’s set-aside authorities and in DOD/DON contracting in general has been on the 
decline.   In terms of procurement policy, data in this study suggests that there are 
clear limits to achieving socio-economic objectives through buyer training and 
buyer empowerment alone.  When buyers are given strict legal mandates for conduct of 
purchases and granted discretion to deviate from them by initiating additional market 
research steps, such discretion becomes disfavored even when it serves a high-profile 
agency cause.  SDVOSB sole sources appear to be particularly disfavored. Further, 
this study provides empirical confirmation to Schooner’s and Sherman’s theoretical 
argument that strong goals coupled with discretionary set-asides are not the most 
effective design features for a socioeconomic program catering to small non-traditional 
suppliers.   
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DOD and DON SDVOSB contracting also underwent realignments in favor of IDVs, 
which require experience that only established firms can provide.  This realignment 
is most pronounced at the DON.  In terms of spending, it appears that DON buyers in 
particular have been shifting work from Open Market to IDVs.  In terms of participation, 
IDV awardees now exceed Open Market awardees.  This realignment confirms the 
need for a broad-based SDVOSB Program that is business development in nature.   
 
The underlying question of the debate about SDVOSB contracting remains: what is the 
proper balance between expectations of pre-existing capability and experience on the 
one hand and the business development needs of a disabled veteran on the other hand?  
Under current laws, regulations, and precedents, an individual Contracting Officer has no 
clear legal or procedural basis on which to make this tradeoff.  What’s worse, an 
individual service-disabled veteran attracted to the SDVOSB Program by policy 
pronouncements would eventually discover the same situation.  Constant policy 
calibration based on program management objectives seems to be the answer to the 
balancing question, not litigation about “consideration” of individual firms or amorphous 
discretion shunned by the buyers. Neither individual buyer empowerment nor judicial 
wrangling about statutory and regulatory interpretation principles can produce the 
kind of outcome-based change that thoughtful performance management reform 
can achieve. 
     
As a matter of policy, there is an urgent need to design an output-based, outcome-
based SDVOSB Procurement Program that would better match the Congressional 
intent going back to the 1999 Congressional Commission recommendations and the 
authorizations in the pre-2004 SDVOSB procurement legislation.  There are two 
options for assigning responsibility for designing such a Program.  One option is for 
the SBA to create a Section 8(a)-like SDBVOSB Business Development Program.  While 
the SBA would appear to have sufficient statutory authorization for such a Program, such 
a Program could require additional Congressional funding outlays or reprogramming of 
existing funds.  Another option, however, is to create a DOD and/or DON SDVOSB 
 98 
Program focused on business development through the strategic use of Simplified 
Acquisitions, including particularly the Simplified Acquisition SDVOSB set-asides.  
Discretion here would be exercised at the DOD or DON level.  Pre-2004 legislative 
authorizations for SDVOSB business development through contracting do not appear to 
be limited to the SBA. Either way, there are seven (7) design features advisable for 
enhancement of this Program.  
 
First, through better understanding which NAICS and PSCs/FSCs show gaps in 
participation by new or niche SDVOSBs, DOD and DON should direct their 
Contracting Officers to give priority consideration of SAP and SAP set-aside 
authorities in these particular industries and requirements.  The immediate 
objective of this reform to the SDVOSB Program reform at DOD or DON level 
would be to create a business development pool of contract requirements which are 
available for developing/emerging SDVOSBs in various industries, particularly 
where only experienced SDVOSBs are currently performing large or complex 
requirements.  Such pool would effectively “accept” as well as “keep” and/or 
prioritize for first consideration in, the SDVOSB Program various contracts 
requirements from across Navy and Marine Corps command, much like is presently 
done with accepting contract requirements into the 8(a) Program.
145
   
 
NAICS codes are instrumental in market research for purposes of set-asides, since an 
SDVOSB must be small under the size standard related to the contract-specific NAICS 
code.  Data in the four Figures below show the trends in NAICS and PSC/FSC 
utilization, along with the gaps in their utilization between SAP and other contracting 
mechanisms for more experienced firms.  Further, data in these four Figures shows that 
DOD maintained a stable, somewhat diminishing number of NAICS and PSC/FSC codes 
for set-asides and all awards.  On the other hand, DON decreased its NAICS and 
                                                 
145 For a description of DOD processes and responsibilities to consider 8(a) Participant capability 
statements and to match DOD 8(a) Program-retained contract requirements with 8(a) Program participants, 
see DFARS Subpart 219.8, Contracting with the U.S. Small Business Administration (the 8(a) Program) 
(2013) and PGI § 219.800 (2013) (incorporating by reference the 8(A) PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENT BETWEEN 
THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE AND THE U.S. SMALL BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION (January 7, 2013), 
available at:  http://www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/policy/policyvault/8(a)_Partnership_Agreement.pdf). 
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PSC/FSC codes for set-asides and all awards.  For Open Market set-asides, the codes of 
all types are decreasing; for IDVs, the trends are opposite.  Again, this confirms the 
growing refusal of Contracting Officers to utilize the SDVOSB Program despite the 
statutory and regulatory grants of discretion.  However, DON has been growing the 
number of all types of codes for SAP, while DOD has been reducing the SAP codes.    
 
Figure 22. DOD SDVOSB NAICS Trends: Use of SDVOSB Program and SAP for 
Industrial Targeting and Business Development. 
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Figure 23. DON SDVOSB NAICS Trends: Use of SDVOSB Program and SAP for 
Industrial Targeting and Business Development. 
 
Figure 24. DOD SVOSB PSC/FSC Trends: Use of SDVOSB Program and SAP for 
Matching SDVOSBs to DOD Requirements. 
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Figure 25. DON SVOSB PSC/FSC Trends: Use of SDVOSB Program and SAP for 
Matching SDVOSBs to DON Requirements. 
DOD and DON should tailor an SDVOSB SAP-based and set-aside-based business 
development pool through gap analysis.  Examples include: 
 the codes which represent the difference between the codes for all SDVOSB
awards and the codes for all SDVOSB set-asides;
146
 the codes which are used only in IDV awards, without set-asides and without
SAP awards;
147
 the codes which are used exclusively in non-SAP Awards (or non-SAP IDV
or Open Market Awards);
148
146 For example, according to the FPDS, just in FY2014 at DOD, there was a 289-code gaps between 
NAICS used for all SDVOSB awards and all SDVOSB set-asides.  It means that in 289 industries, work 
goes to SDVOSBs but they are somehow not being found as part of Rule of Two or Sole Source market 
research, or that set-asides to them are somehow undesirable. It also means that, in 289 industries, 
SDVOSBs have no category-specific pathway into DOD contracting.  The gap expands to 336 industries 
once SDVOSB SAP set-asides are considered, and shrinks to 70 codes once all SAP awards are compared 
with all awards.  This means that in 266 industries, SAP-level set-asides, at least at the sole source level, 
are immediately possible for purposes of the business development pool.  See U.S. GENERAL SERVICES
ADMINISTRATION (GSA), Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) (2015), 
available at: https://www.fpds.gov.    
147 In FY2014, DOD had 242 such NAICS codes.  Id. 
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 the NAICS-PSC/FSC code combinations where either the NAICS or the
PSC/FSC are currently used in SAP or set-asides;
149
 and/or
 other code lists and mixes.
To this end, DOD and DON could exercise various authorities under the SDVOSB 
Program, FAR Part 6 industrial mobilization and alternative sources of supply 
authorities, and FAR Part 13 local trade area vendor solicitation to dedicate 
procurements in certain NAICS or PSCs/FSCs solely to new or niche SDVOSBs.  
Relevant amendments could be made to the FAR, DFARS, NMCARS, SBA 
Regulations, or the Small Business Act if additional authority is thought necessary.  
Second, DOD and DON should partner with the SBA and the VA Veterans Benefits 
Administration, Office of Economic Opportunity, Vocational Rehabilitation & 
Employment Service, on financing and business development assistance for 
SDVOSBs seeking work that is set aside for SDVOSBs under SAP.  The essence of 
this partnership would be to grow the number of SDVOSBs by matching financing 
and business development assistance with dedicated low-dollar, low-paperwork 
contracting opportunities.  The objective here is to reduce Contracting Officers’ 
concerns that awards to emerging SDVOSBs could be risky.  
Third, DOD could arrange for a special SAM.gov registration field as a new, 
nontraditional, or niche SDVOSB contractor, and require Contracting Officers to 
inform at least one such firm that matches the relevant NAICS or PSC/FSC in any 
synopsis, solicitation, or Request for Information (RFI) announcements.   
Fourth, DOD and DON could conduct a targeted registration campaign for 
SDVOSBs in related fields NAICS or PSC/FSC codes through the DLA-sponsored 
Procurement Technical Assistance Centers (PTAC) system.  
Fifth, DOD or DON could create a simplified registration database for transitioning 
servicemembers where they would be able to express interest in Simplified 
148 However, it appears that significant number of requirements was found suitable for SAP even before 
they could be considered for set-asides.  In the new DOD or DON SDVOSB Program, the initial priority 
would go to NAICS and PSCs/FSCs where unrestricted IDV order awards were made, but no SAP awards, 
SAP set-asides, Open Market set-asides, Open Market awards, or IDV set-asides were made.  The next five 
priorities would go to NAICS and PSCs/FSCs next on the list in the prior sentence, in the receding order 
from latter to former.   
149 The same gap analysis can be undertaken with PSCs/FSCs.  For example, at DOD, there is a 523-code 
gap between all and set-aside awards, a 242-code gap between all and SAP awards, and a 655-code gap 
between all and SAP set-aside awards.  Unlike industries, however, the requirements would need 
additional, judgemental evaluations of suitability for new or niche SDVOSBs.  See U.S. GENERAL
SERVICES ADMINISTRATION (GSA), Federal Procurement Data System-Next Generation (FPDS-NG) 
(2015), available at: https://www.fpds.gov.   
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Acquisitions within broadly defined industrial and requirements areas minimizing 
the potential for exclusion due to NAICS or PSC/FSC coding and searching issues.   
Sixth, as part of business case for creating or re-competing each IDV, DOD and 
DON should always consider a SDVOSB vendor development plan that would help 
prepare future SDVOSB vendors, including through ramp-ons, subcontracting, 
mentor-protégé arrangements, SAP awards, and Open Market set-asides to 
participate in specific NAICS and PSC/FSC categories for the IDV at issue.   
And, seventh, DOD should update its SDVOSB Strategic Plan and create military 
department-level Strategic Plans.  DON should create its own SDVOSB Strategic 
Plan, perhaps with subsidiary plans at the level of major Navy and Marine Corps 
commands. Those Plans would: 
 set forth SDVOSB Program outcomes to influence Contracting
Officers’ discretion;
 identify with specificity the business development output targets;
 specify the process for exercising Contracting Officer discretion tied
to helping expand SDVOSB Program outputs as well as inputs; and,
 identify the mix of contracting methods and vehicles the Department
at issue will employ to achieve outcome- and output-based Program
performance, consistent with accepted contract management theory
and SDVOSB procurement policy objectives.
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VII. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH.
Further research on SDVOSB contracting topics is recommended, including: 
• comparisons of DOD/DON SDVOSB Program practices with those of other
military departments;
• trends in contract awards and spending to SDVOSB/SDB firms through the 8(a)
Program and/or the HUBZone Program;
• feasibility of designing a Section 8(a)-style Program for SDVOSBs in cooperation
between the SBA, VA, and DOD/DON;
• evolution of NAICS and PSC/FSC mixes in DOD/DON contracting;
• examination of SBA SDVOSB status decisions and other related cases;
• examination of SDVOSB performance, responsibility, award of options or change
orders and other funding-related problems in DOD/DON SDVOSB contracts; and
• direct comparisons between VA and DOD SDVOSB Programs (to include the
likely impact of Kingdomware VA litigation pending in the U.S. Supreme Court
on the DOD and DON SDVOSB Programs), as well as between the DOD and
DON 8(a) Program and the SDVOSB Program.
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